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00O00 
ROBIN L. MICHAEL, : 
: BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. : 
: Priority No. 15 
RODNEY C. MICHAEL, : 
Defendant/Respondent. : Case No. 950146-CA 
00O00 
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
Appellant jurisdiction arises pursuant to §78-2a-3(2) (g) , 
Utah Code Annotated (1987, as amended) (hereinafter "U.C.A."). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issue presented on appeal is as follows: 
1. Whether the trial court made an error in determining 
that Appellant Robin Michael did not show a substantial, material 
change of circumstances requiring the Court to reach the issue of 
whether a change of custody was in the best interests of the 
children herein. 
1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The following code provisions, statutes and rules are 
determinative in this case and complete copies are in the Appendix 
to this brief: 
1. U.C.A. §30-3-10, statutory best interest criteria 
for custody. 
2. U.C.A. §30-3-10.2 and 10.3, statutory criteria for 
modification of custody orders. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order of Modification of Decree 
and Dismissal of Plaintiff's Petition issued by Judge Timothy R. 
Hanson of the Third Judicial District Court. This Order was 
entered December 14, 1994. No post trial motions were filed. This 
case originated as a divorce issued by a Colorado Court on July 1, 
1991 after a marriage of eight years. Physical custody of the 
parties' two minor children was awarded to Respondent Rodney 
Michael. The Decree of Divorce awarded the parties joint legal 
custody and required that all significant decisions pertaining to 
the children's health, education, religious training and general 
welfare be made jointly by the parties. Appellant Robin Michael 
was awarded substantial and liberal visitation rights. 
On or about October, 1992, Robin Michael filed a Petition 
to Modify concerning custody. A trial was held in July, 1994 at 
2 
which time the Court bifurcated the proceedings directing that it 
would first hear evidence pertaining to the issue of whether a 
substantial, material change of circumstances had occurred prior to 
considering whether it was in the best interests of the children to 
effect a custody change. On August 12, 1994, the Court issued a 
written Memorandum Decision that the evidence did not rise to the 
level necessary to meet the change of circumstances test and that 
the Court would not take any additional evidence on whether a 
change of custody was in the best interests of the children. 
Findings and an Order dismissing Plaintiff's modification petition 
were entered by the Court December 14, 1994. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Overview. 
1. The parties to this appeal were married September 
23, 1983 and were divorced eight years later on July 1, 1991. On 
that date, the District Court for the County Jefferson, State of 
Colorado enter an order dissolving the marriage of the parties. 
2. The Colorado Decree of Divorce (Appendix 1) awarded 
the parties joint legal custody of their minor children with the 
primary physical custody to Mr. Michael. The parties have two 
children namely Schuyler (born December 15, 1985) and Ashleigh 
(born July 10, 1987). (Record, p. 8; paragraph 12, Colorado 
Decree). 
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3. During the pendency of the Colorado divorce action 
Mr. Michael was residing in Colorado with the children and Mrs, 
Michael was commuting between California and Colorado for 
employment reasons. She had taken a substantial job promotion and 
relocated to California with the expectation that Mr. Michael and 
the children would shortly follow. Instead, Mr. Michael filed for 
divorce and was awarded temporary custody. (Record p. 172-182, 
854-856, Amended Petition to Modify). 
4. The Colorado Court determined that it was in the 
best interests of the children that their parents be awarded joint 
legal custody with primary physical custody to Mr. Michael. Robin 
Michael was awarded substantial and liberal visitation and under 
the terms of the joint legal custody plan, the Court ordered all 
major decisions concerning the health, education, religious 
training and general welfare of the children to be made jointly by 
the parties. The Court found that the custody decision was quite 
difficult and that both parties were "excellent parents" stating 
was follows: 
"13. The Court finds that this has been a 
difficult case. Both parties are excellent 
parents. Both parties have taken substantial 
efforts in the past in the best interests of 
the children. Both parties have done a good 
job in parenting their children. There is no 
real difference in the parenting abilities of 
the parties. Both parties are well-adjusted 
and both parties are in good physical and 
mental health. 
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19. The Court has determined that joint legal 
custody is most advantageous to the two 
children. The Court does have some concerns 
because of the physical distance between the 
two parties. The Petitioner is in Utah and 
the Respondent is in California. Such a 
geographical distance is not conducive to 
communication. 
20. The evidence, however, is that the 
parties are interested in making that type of 
arrangement work. Therefore, the benefit to 
the children of joint custody outweighs any 
difficulties a parent at this time with regard 
to their lack of geographic proximity. 
22. The Court develops the following plan for 
joint legal custody. The Petitioner is to be 
the primary residential custodian. All major 
decisions concerning health, education, 
religious training, and general welfare are to 
made jointly. The legal residence of the 
children shall be with the Petitioner. The 
parties are to consult with each other on a 
prompt basis as appropriate without hostility 
or demeaning each other. . . ." (Record, p. 8-
10; Colorado Decree of Divorce). 
5. The Colorado Court also ordered that Robin Michael 
be awarded "substantial visitation" with the children as the 
parties could agree and established a minimum visitation schedule 
as follows: one weekend per month, ten days at Christmas, three 
weeks in the summer, and free telephone access to the children. 
The Court also ordered that both parties should promptly exchange 
information concerning the medical, dental and educational aspects 
of the children and that neither party should prohibit access of 
the other party to such information. The obligation to exchange 
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information specifically extended to report cards, notification of 
scheduled school events, parent-teacher conferences, and exchange 
of all preschool records and reports. 
6. At the time the Colorado Decree was entered, Mr. 
Michael had already moved the children from Colorado to the State 
of Utah as he had been transferred by his employer. At that time, 
Mrs. Michael was residing in California having also been 
transferred there by her employer. (Record, p. 172-182, 1081-
1085). 
7. Once the Colorado Decree was entered Robin Michael 
left her job in California and moved to Utah to be closer to the 
children. She took a substantial reduction in status and 
compensation. (Record, p. 172-182; Amended Petition to Modify). 
8. On or about August 10, 1991, Robin Michael 
domesticated the Colorado Decree in the State of Utah to obtain 
court review of the visitation terms since both parties would be 
residing in the same state. That petition was resolved by 
stipulation of the parties on or about October 7, 1991. (Record, p. 
33-38) (Appendix 2, Third District Court Minute Entry). The 
visitation agreement was that the statewide standard schedule would 
be followed, that if Mr. Michael worked out of town the children 
were to be left with Mrs. Michael, that Mrs. Michael would be given 
a mid-week overnight visit every Wednesday. (Record, p. 29). 
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9 On i :>.r about October 8, ] 992, Robi n Michael filed a 
Petition to Modify concerning custody. That Petition was amended 
ii i December I 99,' alleging LUibsLan1 ; •* " mat:ei: lal chancier '",,|: 
circumstances had occurred since entry -i the Decree. (Record 
172). The allegations D£ changed circumstances included the 
f ol ] o w j i lg: • ..-
a. Mr. M i chae] had remarried and delegated the 
primary care, custody and control of the mi nor children to his new 
wife. Mr Michael's new wife was pregnant and during that time the 
children were often unsupervised, required to prepare their own 
breakfasts and get themselves ready and off to school without adult 
supervision. 1 Ir Michael traveled regularly , at least once per 
montl: I ai id thus left the chi 1 dren wi th alternate caretakers and not 
Robin Michael. 
The minor child Ashleigh had appeared during 
vlsi tail on wi r u Ises on her legs and indicated her father 
spanked her "really hard". August 27, ] 99] Ashleigh appeared with 
a large bruise under her eye. 
c . I I i c h a c 1 I l u id I v,\ nil i thi I "i M I I I in." p h y s i c a l t-fip.r«mv 
n e c e s s a r y for the treatment of Schuyler Michael . 
Schuyler has su f f ered from c erebra l p a l s y and :*.-* p a r t i c i p a t e d :-
p h y s i c a l I hipi.rir.ru .« i iru e t h e a c j e o f f i v e inonit ,., „ti«n:e A p r i l 1 9 9 . 2 , 
Mr. Michael cancelled numerous therapy sessions and delegated 
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the responsibility of that therapy to his new wife Cynthia Michael. 
Since entry of the Colorado Decree, Mr. Michael had refused to 
allow Robin Michael to actively participate in the physical therapy 
and did not provide her with regular information. 
d. On January 22, 1991, Mr. Michael was ordered to 
provide therapy for both children on his arrival to Salt Lake City, 
Utah. He was further ordered to provide monthly written reports to 
the children's mother from the day care provider and the physical 
therapist. Mr. Michael had not complied with these orders. 
e. Since entry of the Colorado order and the move 
of both parties to the State of Utah, the provisions of joint 
custody became unworkable in the following ways: 
i. Mr. Michael had delegated the substantial 
care of the children to his new spouse; 
ii. Mr. Michael had failed to cooperate with 
the shared responsibility of academic and medical 
matters concerning the children. Specifically, he 
had failed to allow Robin to participate in the 
children's school activities, failed to inform 
Robin of the children's teachers, school and 
medical care providers. 
iii. Mr. Michael had unilaterally made 
important decisions about the children's health, 
8 
safety and welfare and academic development without 
permitting input from Robin Michael. 
i. v t "lr M i.c: lint • I re fused t:o let Robi n M.i.chae 1 
take the children to school or from participating 
i children's after school activities and 
phys • - i tl lerapy. 
Between August i October, 1991 
K Michael refused • .. discuss • * . ine of the 
children's
 r eturn following visitation with their 
mother. On one occasion he arrived at the mother's 
home late after the children were asleep 
and insisted that '. r - children leave with him. On 
anotl ler <:>c M i chae] 
mother's home with police arid forcibly removed 
children. 
f. .!"! i.Ticf." entry of the C.'uloiiido Decree the children 
have expressed a desire t, ..;.> - ;.th thei r natural mother and Mr 
Michael has punished children for these statements and for 
maintaining relationship with their mother. This includes 
span . ,-'L I ui I.dJkiiiq 1.1> hin mo H U M mi I lit' telephone, 
refusing t.;; allowing Schuyler to telephone his mother, and taking 
from the children toys, clothing and gifts given them by their 
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mother. Mr. Michael had also told the children they would never 
see their father again if Robin Michael was awarded custody. 
g. Since entry of the Colorado Order Mr. Michael 
instructed the children to call their natural mother "Robin" and to 
refer to their step-mother as "madre" a Spanish term for mother. 
h. On January 26, 1992, Robin Michael attempted to 
obtain information about her daughter's school status and was told 
that she could not obtain that information because the children's 
mother was Cynthia (the step-mother). 
10. On or about November 9, 1992, Mr. Michael notified 
Robin Michael that he was leaving Salt Lake City, Utah and moving 
to Appleton, Wisconsin by Christmas as a result of an employment 
transfer. Mr. Michael's notice to Robin Michael was not consistent 
with the Court order that required a minimum of 90 days advance 
notice. (Record, p. 178-179). 
11. Since the notification that the children would be 
moving from Utah, the children became extremely upset, and 
emotional and Ashleigh had begun bed wetting and clinging to their 
mother. (Record, p. 178-179). 
12. At a hearing held before Commissioner Judith 
Atherton in December, 1992, Mr. Michael was allowed to move the 
children from the State of Utah subject to a liberal visitation 
schedule during the pendency of a child custody evaluation. That 
10 
schedule provided that Mr. .Michael would pay the* costs of 
transporting the children to Utah for a once per month visit 
pending I he i»va ilia I. ] on . Furt IH.-JI „ I lit" Coi 1:1: t appui iited J>i Jil 1 
Sanders to appoint a custody evaluation which order was entered on 
or about April 7, 1! 993, (Record, Minute Entry) 
ey M i cha< - * >p 1 eton , W i HOOIIS i i"i w i t h 
the January, 1993. 
parties have remarried since entry of the 
Colorado Decree, Michael married Cynthia Michael on November 
30, , . \el marri ed Duane CI i.i: riiia 
B. Evaluation of Dr. Jill Sanders. 
custody evaluation - •• performed by Dr. Ji ] J 
S a i i ci e r . L o g i s t, i t i a 1 i: e p o i: I: d a t e d 
December, 1993 recommended that their change in the current 
order of joint custody, with Rodney Michael as primary physical 
::iistodI an (Appendix -. . •!..-• 
Recommendations). Shortly before * trial v . H 9 4 . . ;. 
Sanders reinterviewed the children and preparer supplemental 
r e p o r t slaf.imi) Ihal physij. •'•-•'.• • i- ~ 
Schuyler, should be awarded < aother * .- ;u8.b. 
(Appendix 4; Plaintiff's Exhibit Sanders testified that 
| . j i e c j : i £ ^ c | j i a c | mac|e a dramatic change in nx ixpressions about where 
he preferred to 1 ive, that he was "adamant" about his dislike of 
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his step-mother Cynthia, and that he had articulated episodes of 
mistreatment by his step-mother such as being pushed against a 
bureauf dragged downstairs by his arm and her using foul language 
towards him. Also that he exhibited increased tantrum behavior at 
his father's home which doesn't occur with Robin. (Record 868-
873). Dr. Sanders further testified unequivocally that Schuyler 
was certain to experience harm if he were returned to the custody 
of his father, outlining numerous harmful potential consequences 
including depression, rebellion and running away. 
16. The following is an excerpt from the trial testimony 
of Dr. Jill Sanders in this case given July 12, 1994, Page 47 
(Record, p. 888-889): 
"Well, on the side of not—let's talk about 
not letting him live with his mother. I think 
there are some substantial problems there. I 
"think — I would go to the bookie and bet on 
the fact that if he does not — is not allowed 
to spend — either live with his mother, or 
spend more time with his mother, that his 
negative behavior in Wisconsin will 
accelerate. This is textbook stuff. You read 
about it in — about children of divorce that 
when they are uncomfortable with their 
placement, the easiest way for an eight year 
old to get things changed is to misbehave so 
badly that one of the parents doesn't want 
them any more. So this is real common. It's 
in my mind very predictable, and in fact 
Schuyler told me yesterday what his plans are 
if he isn't allowed to live with his mother. 
So this kid has already advanced to the point 
in his fantasy that he's developed a plan for 
what happens if he doesn't live with his mom. 
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So I think we could certainly expect an 
acceleration of very difficult behavior. 
The kind of adjacent risk to that for Rod and 
Cynthia in particular is that if they have to 
become these really disciplinary parents, the 
good relationship that I think they truly have 
with Schuyler is going to be diminished, if 
not destroyed, fay having to deal consistently 
with a kid who's misbehaving and acting out. 
The second primary risk of not letting him 
live with his mother is his sense of 
powerlessness, and helplessness and 
hopelessness and probably some degree of 
clinical depression would accelerate. I would 
be surprised if I wouldn't see that in 
Schuyler. The third risk is that if he goes 
back to Wisconsin, and lives in his regular 
placement, that the only thing that will 
happen to the idealization that's occurred 
around his mother is going to get worse. It's 
going to get bigger, and she's going to get 
bigger and better, and more wonderful, and 
more perfect I n h i s mi nci the longer he has to 
be away from her. And I think that leads 
sometimes to real extreme behavior, such as 
running away, or truly violent behavior toward 
one of the custodial parents. In terms of the 
risks of — " 
1 7 Attacl led heret :: as Appei id :i x A • 3 „, :ii s ill::,]: le ci is tody 
evaluation Conclusions and Recommendations made by Dr. Jil1 Sanders 
in her initial report dated December 1993. 
18. Attached hereto as Addendum A-4 is a three page 
update to her recommendations prepared by Dr. Jill Sanders for 
trial dated July 10', 1994, Thi s summary contains her revised 
recommendations for custody. 
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19. The initial custody recommendation of Dr. Sanders 
recommends no change to the physical custody relationship but does 
suggest several specific changes to visitation. Dr. Sanders 
recommends that the children spend nine weeks continuous visitation 
with their mother during the summer months, that they spend a seven 
day period in the fall and a seven day period in the spring with 
their mother, that they alternate the Christmas holiday with their 
mother, and that their mother be allowed to visit the children in 
Wisconsin upon providing two weeks notice. (Appendix 3; Dr. 
Sanders Conclusions and Recommendations). 
20. In her revised recommendations prepared at the time 
of trial, Dr. Sanders recommends that at least the child Schuyler 
be allowed to reside with his mother on a trial basis. At the end 
of that time, the child's custody situation should again be 
reviewed. Her summary outlines several reasons for the new 
recommendation. Among these are the following: 
a. Schuyler's preference has dramatically changed-
-he is adamant about residing with his mother, he has expressed a 
strong dislike for his step-mother and has stated episodes of 
physical and emotional abuse. 
b. Dr. Sanders believes this change is based on a 
true attachment and affinity for his mother as well as a fantasy 
that there may be a "better life" with his mother. 
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21. Dr. Sanders believes that the preference and reasons 
outlined by the child Schuyler represent his "psychological 
rea 1 11y *" a i id th«-. .<-: ^ are signi£icant r:i sks to 1:1 Ie ch i 1 d by i iot 
allowing a trial change of physical custody. Those risks include 
the following: 
a I 11 r; i' • e a s e d a c t x i n j i J m J t 11eh a v i m i 11 hi K t: • 1f h e r ' s 
home; 
Increased sense of helplessness, hopelessness, 
p - ' • • - - • 
Increased Idealization of relationships 
possibly leading t » extreme behavior such, as running away. 
C Findings and Ordei ui Court. 
L? " * : was held on * * -,:M iidecl peti tl on to mod i fy 
custody on _--ly 1* through . *• 4 before the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hansor ristrict Court Judge, presiding. 
1'S " ' . I Cum. t", III furcated the proceedings d i i: ecting 
that it won] cl first hear evidence pertaining to the issue of 
whether a substantial, material change <if circumstances had 
occurred prim hi mis i del m g whether, il WM . i n the best intercut is 
of the children t^ t-:iec: .a custody change. 
- ,dqe issued written Memorandum Decision on 
A : ^ » 
level necessary for the Court to r each the questic : .L whether a 
15 
custody change was in the best interests of the children. Attached 
hereto as Appendix 5 is the Memorandum Decision. (Record/ p. 559-
573) 
25. On December 14, 1994, the Court entered Findings and 
an Order in this matter. Copies are attached hereto as Appendix 6. 
(Record, p. 726-758). 
26. The Findings and Order of the Court contain the 
following specifics on the changes of circumstances alleged by 
Robin Michael and on which evidence was presented at trial: 
a. Intended move of Mr. Michael from Utah to 
Wisconsin. This move of Mr. Michael was worked related and 
foreseeable at the time of the parties' divorce. The Court sees no 
improper motive on the part of Mr. Michael to relocate to Wisconsin 
for his employment and sees no improper motive on the part of Robin 
Michael to leave Utah for the state of Missouri since without the 
children residing in Utah she has no ties to the State and her 
extended family support resides in Missouri. The evidence shows 
that the children have made a reasonable transition to Wisconsin, 
and are doing well in school. 
b. Mr. Michael's Remarriage. This is a positive 
rather than a negative factor in the lives of the children. The 
Court interviewed the child Schuyler in chambers and found that his 
description of alleged "abuse" by his mother was not typical of a 
16 
child's language and he may have been influenced to make such 
statements. The allegations that the children have been mistreated 
by their step-mother are not supported by believable evidence. 
c. Visitation Problems. There have been ongoing 
visitation disputes since the divorce was entered in July of 1991 
and this is a continuity of conduct and not a specific change of 
circumstances• 
d. Schuyler's Preference. The Court's designated 
expert, Jill Sanders, has notably changed her position as regards 
custody for Schuyler. She stated that Schuyler had maintained a 
neutral position when initially interviewed and that it changed 
shortly before trial where he asserted strongly that he wanted to 
live with his mother. Dr. Sanders also reported that Schuyler told 
her his step-mother "abused" him. Dr. Sanders could not account 
for this change in position of the minor child other than he 
perceived life with his mother would be better and that perception 
may be based on fantasy and not reality as he has not recently 
lived with his mother on a long term basis. The Court acknowledges 
the strong preference of Schuyler is certainly a change but since 
it is not based on reality, it cannot be considered a change for 
purposes of determining whether or not there has been a significant 
change of circumstances. The Court has no evidence that Schuyler 
has been influenced by Robin Michael but finds that some of the 
17 
child's words and demeanor suggest adult language which may not be 
his own. Further, that even if the Court believed the stated 
change of preference by Schuyler was a material change of 
circumstances, that change in and of itself is insufficient to 
allow the Court to find a material change of circumstances which 
would allow it to move forward to the question of best interests. 
The appellate courts have found that a child's stated change in 
preference alone is insufficient to establish such a change of 
circumstances. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred and abused its discretion in 
determining that the evidence presented at trial by Robin Michael 
was not sufficient to support a substantial, material change of 
circumstances to review the issue of child custody. In evaluating 
the evidence, the Court erred in finding that the child's strong 
preference to change households was insufficient to support a 
review of the custody issue. There was more in this case to 
support a change of circumstances than simply the unsupported 
preference of a minor child. That preference was also analyzed, 
corroborated and supported by the undisputed testimony of the 
custody evaluator Dr. Jill Sanders who testified that the child was 
adamant about changing households and the failure to acknowledge 
this preference would result in real harm to this child such as 
18 
depression, rebellion or running away. The Court thus erred in 
ignoring the testimony of Dr. Sanders or in substituting his own 
judgment for the clear unopposed testimony of the Court's 
designated expert. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CURRENT STANDARDS TO ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR 
CUSTODY MODIFICATION IN UTAH. 
A. The Legal Standard—Hogge Test. 
It has been established by the Court's of this State that 
a party moving for modification of a custody decision must first 
establish that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred 
subsequent to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, and then show 
that the substantial change is one affecting the custodial 
relationship. The leading case is Hogqe v. Hogqe. 649 P.2d 51 
(Utah 1982) where the appellate court articulated a two prong test 
for considering requests to change custody awards. First, the 
party seeking modification must show that there has been a change 
in the circumstances upon which the original custody award was 
based which substantially and materially affects the custodial 
parent's ability or functioning of the custodial relationship. If 
this test is met, the petitioner must show that a change in custody 
is in the best interests of the child. This change of 
circumstances test has been clarified and expanded in subsequent 
cases among them, Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1984). 
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In that case the Court of Appeals explained the nexus between the 
changed circumstances and the welfare of the child as follows: 
"The asserted change must, therefore, have 
some material relationship to and substantial 
effect on parenting ability or the functioning 
of the presently existing custodial 
relationship. In the absence of an indication 
that the change has or will have such effect, 
the materiality requirement is not met. 
In the case of Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court created a limited exception holding that the 
circumstances of a non-custodial parent may also bear upon the 
issue of whether a change of custody is appropriate. 
The Court has articulated at least two major policies 
which are served by the change of circumstances rule as applied to 
custody cases. These are succinctly set forth in the Elmer case as 
follows: 
"First, the emotional, intellectual, and moral 
development of a child depends upon a 
reasonable degree of stability in its 
relationships to important people and to its 
environment. Second, the Courts typically 
favor the one time adjudication of a matter to 
prevent the undue burdening of the Courts and 
the harassing of parties by repetitive 
actions." Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 at 602. 
The Elmer case also made the important policy statement that the 
"res judicata" aspect of the change of circumstances rule must 
always be subservient to the best interests of the child, stating 
that if the circumstances pertaining to a Decree had subsequently 
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changed, a new determination should be made based on a full 
development of all material facts. Id. at 603. This is 
emphasized by Justice Howe in his concurring opinion in the Kramer 
case: 
"The best interests of the child should never 
be lost sight of, and rules on change in 
custody should not be so rigid that this over 
arching principle is not followed. Certainly, 
it is possible that the principle of 
stability, if too rigidly adhered to, can 
result in the continuation of custody in a 
parent who is indifferent to, or destructive 
of, the child's welfare." Elmer v. Elmer. 116 
P.2d at 604. 
B. Standard of Appellate Review. 
The standard of appellate review for trial court findings 
are that they are usually not disturbed on appeal unless they are 
found to be "clearly erroneous". Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 
838 (Utah App. 1991), Walton v. Walton, 814 P.2d 619 (Utah App. 
1991). A trial court's factual determinations are clearly 
erroneous only if they are in conflict with a clear weight of the 
evidence, or if the Court of Appeals has a "definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 
1268, 1271-72 (Utah App. 1990). 
II. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT AT TRIAL TO 
ESTABLISH A MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
HAD OCCURRED TO THE CUSTODIAL RELATIONSHIP. 
The evidence presented to the trial Court by Robin 
Michael should be found sufficient to establish that a substantial 
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material change in circumstances had occurred to the custodial 
relationship justifying review of the custody placement. The Court 
erred in finding that the evidence was insufficient. The testimony 
of Dr. Jill Sanders, the Court appointed custody evaluator was 
emphatic and persuasive that at least the child Schuyler should be 
allowed a trial placement in the physical custody of his mother. 
There was no contrary expert evidence before the Court recommending 
any opposing course of action to that recommended by Dr. Sanders. 
The testimony of Dr. Sanders outlined serious and clear 
risks to the child if he were not allowed to change households and 
reside with his mother. (Record, p. 859-871). These risks are 
also summarized in the supplemental report submitted at trial by 
Dr. Sanders contained in Plaintiff's Exhibit "1" (Appendix 4). 
That summary states that Schuyler was the child most traumatized by 
the divorce and that his strong preference to reside with his 
mother was his "psychological reality". Based on this reality, the 
risk of not letting him reside with this mother would result in the 
following: 
1. Increase in acting out behavior in Wisconsin to make 
[his father] not want him. 
2. Increased sense of helplessness, hopelessness, 
powerlessness, and possibly depression. 
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3. Increased idealization of relationships, possibly 
leading to extreme behavior (i.e. run away). (Appendix 4) 
Dr. Sanders also outlined the risk of letting him live 
out his fantasy [residing with this mother] as follows: 
1. Extreme disappointment and anger when fantasy of 
exceeding better life does not materialize. 
2. Considerable guilt about leaving father, siblings 
(Appendix 4). 
After presenting careful testimony about the change in 
preference of the child Schuyler and analyzing for the Court the 
above-stated risks, Dr. Sanders recommended that Schuyler's time 
with his mother be extended for approximately two months, that this 
preference be reviewed at that time. If the preference was still 
strong, then Schuyler should be allowed to remain with this mother 
from September through December and again be reevaluated at that 
time along with a review of status of his younger sister Ashleigh 
and what impact there may be on the splitting of the sibling unit. 
(Record, p. 891-893) 
The testimony of Dr. Sanders was very strong and 
unequivocal which is the same way she reports the preference as 
stated by the child Schuyler. There was no contradiction to the 
testimony of Dr. Sanders at the time of trial and no opposing 
expert or factual dispute was made as to the child's preference 
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which was admitted by all parties. The judge interviewed the child 
Schuyler in chambers and in his Memorandum Decision filed in this 
case agrees that the preference was reiterated. He also finds that 
Schuyler used inappropriate, overly adult language in describing 
"abuse" in his home and that overall his statements were "not as 
strong" as those related by Dr. Sanders. For these reasons the 
judge apparently discounts the preference of the child Schuyler, 
and overrides the testimony of Dr. Sanders. He also finds that the 
preference is based on fantasy so it does not support a change of 
circumstances. This is contrary to what Dr. Sanders stated that it 
is important and part of the child's psychological reality even if 
his preference may be based on fantasy. (Record, p. 887). He also 
finds specifically that "a child's stated change in preference, 
even when based in reality, is not sufficient in and of itself to 
make a change of circumstances to meet the requirements of the 
first phase in the petition to modify custody." (Record, p. 559-
573; Memorandum Decision—Appendix 5). 
The Court errs in stating that it is merely a preference 
of a child being asserted by Mrs. Michael to support a modification 
of custody. Rather, it is the testimony of the Court designated 
expert that is being relied upon which corroborates and evaluates 
that preference in a larger context. The evaluator has thoroughly 
interviewed all parties and the child over a significant period of 
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time. thus, many other elements support her conclusion to modify 
custody such as the child's strained relationship with his father 
and his dislike of his stepmother which led to tantrums in the 
custodial home which did not occur with his mother. The tantrums 
were significant enough that the father sought therapy for the 
child with Dr. Seay. (Record, p. 860-861; 943). There were also 
suggestions of physical abuse toward Schuyler in the home. 
(Record, p. 868-871). Dr. Sanders then testified to the dramatic 
and certain harmful consequences that would occur to the child 
Schuyler if he were not allowed to change households. In light of 
this unrefuted, expert testimony it was error for the Court not to 
proceed to the issue of whether it was in best interests of the 
child to change households. 
The facts of this case are very similar to that of 
Williams V. Williams, 655 P.2d 652 (Utah 1982) , where the trial 
court held a custody decree should be modified. In that case the 
Court found sufficient circumstances to modify custody where four 
of the parties children expressed strong preferences to change 
households in addition to the custodial parent having another child 
out-of-wedlock and the remarriage and greater stability shown by 
the non-custodial parent since the divorce. The Supreme Court 
commented on the children's preferences stating: 
"such preference are properly considered by 
the trial court in determining future custody 
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although they are not necessarily 
controlling". Jji. at 652. 
Similarly the case of Mitchell v. Mitchell, 668 P.2d 561 
(Utah 1983), also presents a case where a modification occurred 
based on a combination of children's preference and other factors 
showing problems in the custodial placement. Significant to that 
Court was the ongoing conflict between the parents which had 
affected the children. Such tensions were also shown in the case 
at bar although minimized by the trial court. It was error for 
Judge Hansen to minimize the acts of Mr. Michael towards Robin 
Michael which directly affected the children's relationships. He 
had restricted the communications between the children and Robin 
(Record, p. 884-886); interfered with their visits, and did not 
provide information to her, interrupted Schuyler's therapy (Record, 
p. 1120-1145) moved the children away from their mother, (Record, 
725, 939) and would not allow Robin to attend Ashleigh's gymnastics 
(Record, p 8). 
The current case is also similar to that of Wiese v. 
Wiese, 469 P.2d 504 (Utah 1970) an early custody modification case 
where a custody change was made. Although this case does not 
arise in the context of the Hogqe-Becker, modification test, it 
presents a useful guide to the question of how expert testimony 
should impact a custody modification issue. In that case, two 
clinical psychologists testified that the psychological state of 
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the children was such that a change of households from the father's 
home to the mother, was necessary to serve the best interests of 
the children. Each of the parties in that case had an independent 
psychologist evaluate the children and testify at trial. Both 
psychologists were in agreement that the children were emotionally 
disturbed showing insecurities, depression and other symptoms after 
having residing with and been in the care of their father for a 
period of time. In the present case, Dr. Sanders makes similar 
conclusions as regard Schuyler that he will become depressed, 
hopeless or worse if not allowed to live with this mother. 
In the context of the Hoqge-Becker line of cases the 
evidence presented in the current trial by the strong, unrefuted 
testimony by the expert coupled with the child Schuyler's 
preference must be considered sufficient to establish a 
substantial, material change of circumstances. The Hoqqe case 
requires that a change must be shown which "affects the custodial 
parent's parenting ability or the functioning of the custodial 
relationship . . .,f. The risks outlined by Dr. Sanders if Schuyler 
were forced to remain in his father's care include increased 
rebellion, depression or running away. Moreover, the child's 
preference was described as "adamant" and such a strong preference 
of a child to live with his other parent can only be the result of 
a substantial change in the relationship between the custodial 
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parent and the child. Indeed, that was dramatically pointed out in 
the instant case when the child appeared to be struggling to 
maintain a neutral position at the time of the initial evaluation 
in December of 1993 and then six months later was expressing a very 
strong, preference. This is unquestionably a "change in the 
custodial parent circumstance" and/or "a change affecting the 
custodial relationship" as contemplated in the case of Hoqqe, 
Becker and subsequent cases. Moreover, there were additional 
factors beyond the preference of the child Schuyler which were 
pointed out by Dr. Sanders in her testimony. She indicated that 
the child had a very tense and unhappy relationship with his step-
mother and accused her of dragging him down the stairs by his 
crippled arm, and pushing him roughly against bureau. That the 
step-mother used foul language and the child had frequent tantrums 
in the father's home which led him to be enrolled in therapy. She 
also notes historical charges of physical abuse by Mr. Michael 
during the marriage toward his step-daughter. (Record, P. 857-859, 
861, 868-873). 
Language in the Elmer case also supports a finding that 
the evidence presented by Mrs. Michael supports a finding of 
changed circumstances. In Elmer, the Court clearly articulated the 
policies behind the change of circumstance rule. Among these is to 
"further the emotional, intellectual and moral development of the 
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child". Unquestionably, the expert testimony in this case outlined 
potent and real risks to the child's emotional and mental health if 
he were forced to remain in his father's home. 
Moreover, the Elmer court took pains to discuss the type 
of stability intended by the rules outlined in that decision. 
Rather than emphasizing stability of the "legal custody arrangement 
as such" the Court again emphasized that it viewed stability as the 
means to promote "psychological and emotional security that 
underlies a child's well developed sense of self-worth and self-
confidence. Elmer at 604. In reviewing the policy issues, it is 
important to acknowledge the wide acceptance given to two 
concurring opinions in the Kramer case by Justices Howe and 
Stewart, See, Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989), 
and Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah 1991), among others. 
These concurring opinions cautioned against a rigid application of 
the Court's "change of circumstances" requirement and Justice 
Stewart proposed that the "preservation of stability in a 
destructive parent-child relationship would ultimately be more 
detrimental to the interests of the child". Kramer, 738 P.2d at 
628 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result). Justice Howe also 
suggested certain situations where rigid application of the Hogqe 
rule would work against the best interests of the child, as where 
custody is originally grounded on the temporary incapacity of one 
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parent, where both parents were marginal, or where custody is 
obtained by default. Kramer, 738 P.2d at 629 (Howe, J., concurring 
in the result). 
Thus, it is imperative that the trial courts not impose 
an overly rigid approach to questions of custody modification. 
Rather, it is vital that "the res judicata aspect of the changed 
circumstances rule must always be subservient to the best interests 
of the child". Elmer, 776 P.2d at 603. 
The evidence presented by Robin Michael at trial clearly 
meets the requirement that there are changes and problems to be 
addressed in the custodial parent's household. Arguably, there can 
be no better evidence of problems and concerns in a custodial 
parent's household than a child who is reporting episodes of abuse 
and articulating a strong preference to leave that household which 
is undisputed. It is also important to realize that it is more 
than a child's preference being discussed in the instant case 
rather it is the "psychological reality" of the child which the 
expert witness has outlined in terms of serious, harmful future 
consequences to the child if unheeded. To require this child to 
remain in his father's household in the face of such clear evidence 
that there are serious problems in the custodial relationship with 
that child, must be considered a dangerous and in this case, 
unnecessary risk. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court herein committed error in dismissing 
Plaintiff's Petition for Modification for failure to establish a 
substantial material change of circumstances concerning custody. 
The Court ignored the weight of the evidence, significantly the 
strong preference of the child Schuyler and unopposed testimony of 
the designated expert Dr. Jill Sanders who outlined serious, 
unequivocal risks of serious harm to the child if a change of 
household did not occur. The overriding consideration in child 
custody determinations is the child's best interests Paryzek v. 
Parvzek, 776 P.2d 78 (Utah App. 1989) and that has been reiterated 
in the custody modification cases notably Hogge, Becker. and 
Kramer. Given the high certainty of harm anticipated by the expert 
to at least one child in this case, it was inappropriate for the 
Court to ignore the expert recommendation to change custody on a 
trial basis. 
DATED this day of July, 1995. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
SUZANNE MARELIUS 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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Statutes 
30-3-9 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
Utah. Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224,342 P.2d dated pnor to the second marriage, the second 
94 (1959). marnage was valid. Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah 
Where a wife obtained an interlocutory di- 2d 224, 342 P.2d 94 (1959). 
vorce decree in California and, subsequent to 
the expiration of one year therefrom, married a Cited m Van Der Stappen v. Van Der 
second husband and later applied for and re- Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
ceived a nunc pro tunc final divorce judgment 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and C.J.S. — 27C C.J.S. Divorce § 764. 
Separation § 432. Key Numbers. — Divorce «=» 320. 
30-3-9. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 30-3-9 (R.S. 1898 & C.L. marital rights by the guilty party in a divorce 
1907, § 1213; C.L. 1917, § 3005; R.S. 1933 & proceeding, was repealed by Laws 1969, ch. 72, 
C. 1943, 40-3-9), relating to the forfeiture of § 26. 
30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or 
divorce — Custody consideration. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their 
marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court shall make an order for the 
future care and custody of the minor children as it considers appropriate. In 
determining custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and 
the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. The 
court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the children's 
desires regarding the future custody, but the expressed desires are not 
controlling and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the 
court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of 
the child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with 
the noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate. 
(3) If the court finds that one parent does not desire custody of the child, or 
has attempted to permanently relinquish custody to a third party, it shall take 
that evidence into consideration in determining whether to award custody to 
the other parent. 
History: L. 1903, ch. 82, § 1; C.L. 1907, Cross-References. — Disposition of prop-
§ 1212x; CX. 1917, § 3004; R.S. 1933 & C. erty and children, § 30-3-5. 
1943, 40-3-10; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 7; 1977, ch. Removal of children from homestead, § 30-2-
122, § 5; 1988, ch. 106, § 1; 1993, ch. 131, § 1. 10. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 3, 1993, added Subsection 
(3). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Children's choice. 
. , Custody evaluation reports. 
A c t i o n of section. F a c t o r s i n determining best interests of child. 
Award proper. —Improper factors. 
Change of custody. —Moral character. 
—Burden of proof. —Sexual abuse. 
480 
30-3-10.2 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
interest of the child often requires that a primary physical residence for 
the child be designated; and 
(5) does not prohibit the court from specifying one parent as the 
primary caretaker and one home as the primary residence of the child. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.1, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 106, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Statutory Enactments — Fam-
ily Law, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 363. 
30-3-10.2. Joint legal custody order — Factors for court 
determination — Public assistance. 
(1) The court may order joint legal custody if it determines that joint legal 
custody is in the best interest of the child and: 
(a) both parents agree to an order of joint legal custody; or 
(b) both parents appear capable of implementing joint legal custody. 
(2) In determining whether the best interest of a child will be served by 
ordering joint custody, the court shall consider the following factors: 
(a) whether the physical, psychological, and emotional needs and de-
velopment of the child will benefit from joint legal custody; 
(b) the ability of the parents to give first priority to the welfare of the 
child and reach shared decisions in the child's best interest; 
(c) whether each parent is capable of encouraging and accepting a 
positive relationship between the child and the other parent; 
(d) whether both parents participated in raising the child before the 
divorce; 
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of the parents; 
(f) the preference of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity 
to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to joint legal custody; 
(g) the maturity of the parents and their willingness and ability to 
protect the child from conflict that may arise between the parents; and 
(h) any other factors the court finds relevant. 
(3) The determination of the best interest of the child shall be by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
(4) The court shall inform both parties that an order for joint custody may 
preclude eligibility for public assistance in the form of aid to families with 
dependent children, and that if public assistance is required for the support of 
children of the parties at any time subsequent to an order of joint legal custody, 
the order may be terminated under Section 30-3-10.4. 
(5) The court may order that where possible the parties attempt to settle 
future disputes by a dispute resolution method before seeking enforcement or 
modification of the terms and conditions of the order of joint legal custody 
through litigation, except in emergency situations requiring ex parte orders to 
protect the child. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.2, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 106, § 3; 1990, ch. 112, § 1. 
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DIVORCE 30-3-10.3 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Construction and application. substantial and substantive; thus, retroactive 
The 1990 amendment of this section did not application is not appropriate. Thronson v. 
make a mere procedural change or simply clar- Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
ify how the 1988 statute should have been denied, 826 R2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
understood originally. The amendment was 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Parental rights of man who is not was conceived or born, 84 A.L.R.4th 655. 
biological or adoptive father of child but was Child custody and visitation rights of person 
husband or cohabitant of mother when child infected with AIDS, 86 A.L.R.4th 211. 
30-3-10.3. Terms of joint legal custody order. 
(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, before a final order of joint legal 
custody is entered both parties shall attend the mandatory course for divorcing 
parents, as provided in Section 30-3-11.3, and present a certificate of comple-
tion from the course to the court. 
(2) An order of joint legal custody shall provide terms the court determines 
appropriate, which may include specifying: 
(a) either the county of residence of the child, until altered by further 
order of the court, or the custodian who has the sole legal right to 
determine the residence of the child; 
(b) that the parents shall exchange information concerning the health, 
education, and welfare of the child, and where possible, confer before 
making decisions concerning any of these areas; 
(c) the rights and duties of each parent regarding the child's present 
and future physical care, support, and education; 
(d) provisions to minimize disruption of the child's attendance at school 
and other activities, his daily routine, and his association with friends; 
and 
(e) as necessary, the remaining parental rights, privileges, duties, and 
powers to be exercised by the parents solely, concurrently, or jointly. 
(3) The court shall, where possible, include in the order the terms agreed to 
between the parties. 
(4) Any parental rights not specifically addressed by the court order may be 
exercised by the parent having physical custody of the child the majority of the 
time. 
(5) (a) The appointment of joint legal custodians does not impair or limit 
the authority of the court to order support of the child, including payments 
by one custodian to the other. 
(b) An order of joint legal custody, in itself, is not grounds for modifying 
a support order. 
(c) The agreement may contain a dispute resolution procedure the 
parties agree to use before seeking enforcement or modification of the 
terms and conditions of the order of joint legal custody through litigation, 
except in emergency situations requiring ex parte orders to protect the 
child. 
487 
A-1 
J
"^' "'-':.':C..rty 
DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF COLORADO „„ ,„„ . 
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PERMANENT ORDERS ,.,. 
In re the Marriage of: ^FERSQty 
RODNEY C. MICHAEL, Petitioner, 
»s. 
and 
ROBIN L. MICHAEL, Respondent. 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on April 24 and April 25, 
1991 for a Decree of Dissolution of Marriage and Permanent 
Orders. The Petitioner was represented by his attorney of record, 
Carolyn L. Sampson. The Respondent was represented by her 
attorney of record, Owen L. Oliver. The Court has reviewed the 
evidence, the two custody evaluations, and has heard the 
statements' of counsel. 
THE COURT hereby makes the following findings of fact and 
enters the following orders:, 
1. The parties were married on September 25, 1983 in 
Liberty, Missouri. The Court has jurisdiction over both parties 
and the subject matter of this action. 
2. At least one party has been a resident and 
domiciliary of Colorado for at least ninety days prior to the 
commencement of this action. 
3. Ninety days have elapsed since the Court obtained 
jurisdiction over the Respondeat. 
4. The Respondent submitted herself to the jurisdiction 
of this Court by filing a response to the Petition for Dissolution 
of Marriage. 
5. The marriage is irretrievably broken. 
6. The marriage is hereby dissolved and a Decree of 
Dissolution of Marriage enters. 
7. The parties have entered into a stipulation providing 
for the division of property and debt, and the responsibility for 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL, ROBIN L 
VS 
MICHAEL, RODNEY C 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 915900171 MI 
DATE 10/07/91 
HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER 
COURT REPORTER TAPE 1(600-1046) 
COURT CLERK SPO 
TYPE OF HEARING: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. ALLEN, JANE 
D. ATTY. PRO SE 
STIPULATION 
ON MOTION OF 
PLAINTIFF 
1. STANDARD VISITATION TO OCCUR. 
2. IF DEFT WORKS OUT OF TOWN, HE IS TO CONTACT HER & LET HER 
VISIT CHILDREN. 
3. PLTF PAY 1/2 CHILD CARE AS SPECIFIED THROUGH HER EMPLOYMENT. 
4. PLTF PAY CHILD SUPPORT PER GUIDELINES AS SPECIFIED. 
5. GRANDPARENTS HAVE VISITATION AS SPECIFIED. 
IN DISPUTE, COMM. RECOMMENDS: 
1. CHANGE IN CHILD SUPPORT - DEFERRED. 
2. MIDWEEK VISITATION - PLTF HAVE MIDWEEK VISITATION EVERY 
WEDNESDAY (OVERNIGHT). 
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the payment of attorney's fees and costs. The Court determines 
that said stipulation is fair, equitable, and not unconscionable. 
The Court has considered the stipulation in light of the factors 
set forth in C.R.S. 14-10-113. The Court hereby approves the 
stipulation and makes it an Order of this Court. 
8. Neither party has requested maintenance and therefore 
both parties have implicitly waived it. The Court finds from the 
evidence that neither party is eligible for maintenance. The 
evidence clearly establishes that each is capable of supporting 
him or herself. 
9. The primary issue before the Court is the custody of 
the two minor children of the marriage. Two children were born as 
issue of this marriage: Schuyler Michael, born December 17, 1985, 
and currently 5 years old and Ashleigh Michael, born July 10, 
1987, and currently 3 years old. No other children are expected. 
10. The Court finds that these two children are minors 
and unemancipated. The Court finds that it is appropriate for 
this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the issue of custody 
pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. 
11. The Court finds that C.R.S. 14-10-124 and 14-10-123.5 
are both applicable. The Court is to determine custody in the 
best interests of the children. 
12. The Court finds that the best interests of the 
children is served by the parties having joint legal custody of 
both children, with the primary physical custody of both children 
with the Petitioner. 
13. The Court finds that this has been a difficult case. 
Both parties are excellent parents. Both parties have taken 
substantial efforts in the past in the best interests of the 
children. Both parties have done a good job in parenting their 
children. There is no real difference in the parenting abilities 
of the parties. Both parties cure well adjusted and both parties 
are in good physical and mental health. 
14. The Court also finds that both parties have used poor 
judgment in the past which has had an adverse impact on the 
children. The Petitioner on one occasion over-reacted with 
respect to the discipline of another child of the Respondent to 
the point that the discipline was abusive. The Respondent's 
decision to take the children and hide for a period of time was 
not appropriate. 
15. The Court also finds that on occasion both parties 
have made career decisions that indicated a priority for their 
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career over their children. Those decisions, however, do not 
reflect on either party's parenting ability. 
16. The Court therefore has determined custody primarily 
on two factors. " " ^ 
17. The first of these factors is that these children are 
relatively young and thnt thny-had a miTnhftr nf unsettling events 
in their life." These include the fact that they were separated 
from their mother at an early agef that the Respondent took the 
children from Missouri, and the Petitioner's recent move with the 
children to Salt Lake City. The Court determines mat it would be 
inappropriate to modify the children's present situation in that 
it would simply be one more unsettling event to which they would 
need to adjust. 
18. The second of these factors is that the children 
appear^tojpe doing well in the current situation. They are 
generally happy anci well_ adjusted under the physicial custody of 
the Petitioner. If the Court continues the physical custody with 
Petitioner, there is assurance that the children will continue to 
do well. If the Court were to change physical custody, there 
would be uncertainty as to how the children would do. 
19. The Court has determined that joint legal custody is 
most advantageous to the two children. The Court does have some 
concerns because of the physical distance between the twca 
parties. The Petitioner is in Utah and the Respondent is^ln 
California. Such a geographical distance is not conducive to 
communication. 
20. The evidence, however, is that the parties arq^  
n^-hAT^ cs'hPfi -in making that type of arrangement work. Thereforej 
the fienefit to the children of joint custody outweighs any 
difficulties apparent at this time with regard to their lack of 
geographic proximity. 
21. The Court is also concerned about the substantial 
amount of distrust between the parties. Such distrust is not 
conducive to good communications between the parties. The Court 
hopes that the entry of final orders will assist the parties with 
regard to this issue. 
22. The Court develops the following plan for joint legal 
custody. The Petitioner is to be the primary residential 
custodian. All major decisions concerning health, education, 
religious training, and general welfare are to be made jointly. 
The legal residence of the children shall be with the Petitioner. 
The parties are to consult with each other on a prompt basis as 
appropriate without hostility or demeaning each other. In the 
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case of a medical emergency, that parent having physical care of 
the children at the time shall make the necessary decisions. 
23. The Court orders that the Respondent shall have 
substantial visitation with her children as the parties can 
agree. The Court feels that it is appropriate for the Respondent 
to have visitation with the minor children. 
24. The Court establishes the following minimum 
visitation: 
A. One weekend per month; 
B. Ten days at Christmas; 
C. Three weeks in the summer; and 
D. Free telephone access to the children. 
25. The Court orders that both parties shall promptly 
exchange information concerning the medical, dental, and 
educational aspects of both children. Neither party is to 
prohibit apcess of the other party to that type of information. 
The obligation to properly exchange information extends to report 
cards, notification of scheduled events at school, notification of 
scheduled parent/teacher conferences, and exchange of all 
preschool records and report^. 
26. The Court finds that C.R.S. 14-10-115 is applicable. 
27. The Court determines that the income of the 
Petitioner is $5,334 per month. This is computed on the basis of 
a $1,654 base salary every two weeks for a base salary of $3,584 
per month. To this is added an average commission of $1,750 per 
month, based on $5 per $1,000 of sales for total sales of $150,000 
and $2 per $1,000 of sales for total sales of $500,000. 
28. The Court finds that the income of the Respondent is 
$4,875. The Court determines that the Respondent has a salary of 
$4,385 and that she has an average bonus on a monthly basis of 
$490. 
29. The Petitioner can deduct the $31 that he pays each 
month for medical insurance which includes coverage for the 
children. 
30. The Respondent can deduct the support obligation 
which she has for a child by a prior marriage in the amount of 
$610 per month. 
-4-
31. This gives the Petitioner an adjusted gross income of 
$5,303 and the Respondent an adjusted gross income of $4,275 for a 
combined monthly adjusted gross income of $9,578, 
32. The Petitioner's share of the combined monthly 
adjusted gross income is 55% and the Respondent's share of the 
monthly adjusted gross income is 45%. 
33. The basic child support obligation is $1,484. The 
Court determines that the work related child care costs after the 
federal tax credit are $278 per month for a total child support 
obligation of $1,762 per month. 
34. The Respondent's share of that total child support 
obligation is $792. 
35. Therefore, it will be the Order of this Court that 
the Respondent shall pay child support in the amount of $792 per 
monnth commencing on May 1, 1991. Said child support is due on 
the first day of each month thereafter and shall be paid directly 
to the Petitioner. 
36.. The Petitioner is to maintain health insurance for 
the benefit of the minor children. 
37. The Petitioner's counsel is to file the Stipulation of 
the parties, a written form of these Permanent Orders, and the 
appropriate Worksheet A on or before May 24, 1991. 
SO ORDERED this 
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STIPULATION 
ON MOTION OF 
PLAINTIFF 
1. STANDARD VISITATION TO OCCUR. 
2. IF DEFT WORKS OUT OF TOWN, HE IS TO CONTACT HER & LET HER 
VISIT CHILDREN. 
3. PLTF PAY 1/2 CHILD CARE AS SPECIFIED THROUGH HER EMPLOYMENT. 
4. PLTF PAY CHILD SUPPORT PER GUIDELINES AS SPECIFIED. 
5. GRANDPARENTS HAVE VISITATION AS SPECIFIED. 
IN DISPUTE, COMM. RECOMMENDS: 
1. CHANGE IN CHILD SUPPORT - DEFERRED. 
MIDWEEK VISITATION - PLTF HAVE MIDWEEK VISITATION EVERY 
WEDNESDAY (OVERNIGHT). 
2. 
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CUSTODY EVALUATION CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
IDENTIFYING INFORMATION: 
MICHAEL V. MICHAEL 
Utah No. 915900171CV 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
ATTORNEYS: Suzanne Marelius and John Mason 
DATES OF EVALUATION: 4-16-93, 6-7-93, 8-9-93, 8-10-93, 10-22-93, 
1-26-93. Collateral Interviews: 11-23-93; additional phone 
conversations/interviews with Robin, Rodney and Cynthia, not 
individually listed; review of documents (see attached list) . 
EVALUATOR: 
Jill D. Sanders, Ph.D., Clinical Psychologist 
CASE SUMMAWY 
Rodney Michael was awarded temporary custody of Ashleigh and Schuyler 
Michael in December, 1989, in Colorado. Following two custody 
evaluations, Rodney and Robin were awarded joint legal custody and 
Rodney was awarded physical custody of both children in 1992. Robin 
Michael is seeking a change in the physical custody arrangement. Both 
parties have remarried. Robin and Duane Clink and Haley Coleman 
(Robin's daughter from her first marriage) live in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Rodney, Cynthia, Ashleigh, Schuyler, and Jake Michael (Rodney 
and Cynthia's biological child) live in Appleton, Wisconsin. 
FACTORS CONSIDERED: 
Preference of Child 
Over the course of the last two evaluations, these children have made 
various statements regarding preference. Dr. Hansen, in her 
evaluation dated 4-4-91, reported that Schuyler; "Stated that he 
always wanted to live with his dad and Ashleigh said she wanted to 
live with her mother." During my interviews with the children, they 
were able to articulate factors which they liked about each adult 
party, including stepparents, and had very little negative information 
to report about anyone. Schuyler indicated to me that he felt best 
when staying with his grandparents in Missouri, while Ashleigh 
indicated that she felt best in Missouri and Wisconsin (biological 
father's home) . Both children also indicated that they would like to 
spend more time with their mother, though neither child verbalized a 
desire to switch primary residence. It is my opinion that Schuyler 
is working very hard to maintain neutrality. This is occurring at 
considerable cost to him in terms of anxiety, hypervigilance, and fear 
that he will alienate one or both parents. Ashleigh, probably because 
of her younger age at the time of the divorce, appears to have 
adjusted well to having two homes. Both children prefer Missouri, 
Jill D. Sanders, Ph.D. 
Cluneal Ps\chologist 
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simply because they perceive it to be neutral territory. In my 
opinion, preference of the children is not a controversial or 
significant issue in this case/ 
Maintenance of Sibling Unit 
Ashleigh and Schuyler should continue to reside together. They have 
a significant relationship with each other and probably rely on each 
other for stability. Ashleigh and Schuyler have a half-sister, Haley, 
who lives with their mother, and a half-brother, Jake, who lives with 
their father. I found no evidence to suggest that either of these 
half-sibling relationships was emotionally more important to Schuyler 
and Ashleigh than the other. 
Parent-Child Bond 
These children appear to be appropriately and equivalently bonded to 
both parents. Neither parent appears to have attempted to emotionally 
coerce the children. Additionally, Schuyler and Ashleigh have 
significant relationships with both stepparents. 
Maintenance of Previously Determined Custody Arrangement 
This is a, sTgnificant ^ tacfeea?-:- Rodney Michael has been the primary 
custodial parent, ot" Ashleigh and Schuyler for the past four years. 
There is no evidence to suggest that these children have been 
neglected or abused in Rodney's care. There is considerable evidence 
to suggest that Ashleigh and Schuyler are happy and well-adjusted in 
this placement, and that they are receiving appropriate educational, 
medical, and social support. 
Capacity to Parent 
Both Robin Clink and Rodney Michael are persons of high moral 
character, as are their respective spouses. Neither party is 
emotionally unstable. Neither party has a history of functional 
impairment due to substance abuse. Both parties have the capacity to 
financially support these children. Religious incompatibility was not 
raised by either party as a significant issue. 
In regard to demonstrated depth and desire for custody, Robin Clink 
has the weaker history. She voluntarily left Haley in the care of 
Rodney Michael when she went to Missouri to recover from Ashleigh's 
birth. During this absence, Rodney used excessive physical force in 
disciplining Haley. When Robin moved to California in 1989, she 
voluntarily left Ashleigh, Schuyler, and Haley, in Rodney's care. 
After nine months of Haley living with Rodney, Robin allowed Haley to 
live with Haley's maternal grandparents for the next 1-1/2 years. 
Ashleigh was eighteen months old when Robin left for California. This 
long-distance parent-child relationship continued for the next two 
years, until Robin moved back to Utah in 1991. In my opinion, these 
instances constitute significant lapses in desire on Robin's part to 
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provide daily care. This opinion is tempered only in part by the fact 
that Robin did provide the bulk of primary care for all three children 
prior to moving to California. 
The fact that Rodney Michael physically abused Haley, Robin's daughter 
from her first marriage, on at least one occasion, was not minimized. 
Rodney's behavior was inexcusable. Haley's current statements about 
repeated abuse from Rodney have limited credibility. Haley personally 
reports that she remembers very little about that time in her life, 
and believes memories of more extensive abuse have been spurred by 
discussions with her grandmother and mother. There is no question 
that Rodney used inappropriate force with Haley on one occasion, but 
further abuse does not appear substantiated. Both Robin Clink and 
Rodney Michael have used spanking as a form of punishment for their 
children. And though this evaluator believes spanking is 
inappropriate and ineffective, there is no evidence to suggest that 
either Robin or Rodney have used excessive force in recent years. 
Willingness to Foster A Relationship with the Other Parent 
Though Robin perceives that Rodney has interfered with her visitation, 
it is my opinion that instances where visitation did not occur, were 
not malicious attempts on Rodney's part to deprive Robin of 
Visitation. Documents suggest that Rodney offered Robin more 
visitation than required when she returned to Utah and before Rodney 
moved to Wisconsin. The current visitation schedule is logistically 
difficult, and I found that Rodney has, for the most part, complied 
to the best of his ability. 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
1) It is recommended that Rodney Michael and Robin Clink continue 
to exercise joint legal custody. This aspect of the custody 
arrangement has created little conflict. 
2) It is recommended that Rodney Michael continue as primary 
physical custodian. These are both good parents, with 
demonstrated parenting skills, and good intentions. The 
recommendation to maintain primary residence with Rodney is on 
the basis of continuing an in-place arrangement which is 
functioning well. 
3) The current visitation schedule is unworkable. From the 
perspective of the child, it requires a great deal of travel, 
much of it unaccompanied, in return for a very short visit. It 
is highly disruptive of their school schedule. It is also 
financially burdensome. These children are of the age that 
longer visitation periods with their mother, as opposed to more 
frequent visits, are preferable. Consequently, I propose the 
following changes in visitation: 
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a) Ashleigh and Schuyler spend nine continuous weeks with 
their mother during the summer months. 
b) Ashleigh and Schuyler spend one 7-day period in the early 
fall and one 7-day period in the early spring with their 
mother. Travel to their mother would occur on Saturday, 
travel to Wisconsin would occur on the following Sunday. 
c) Ashleigh and Schuyler spend one 7-day period at 
Thanksgiving with their mother one year, and the entire 
Christmas holiday with their mother the next year. 
d) Robin could also exercise visitation in Wisconsin, with a 
2-week notice given to Rodney. 
4) As per Utah guidelines for non-custodial parents, Robin should 
have direct access to all personnel involved with her^children's 
academic, medical, and extracurricular activities. Robin should 
take responsibility for regularly contacting such persons in 
order to maintain an understanding of her children's activities. 
Robin should be notified immediately in the case of any medical 
emergency. She is allowed to attend any/all of the children's 
school conferences, school activities, and extracurricular 
activities. She should have free telephone access to the 
children. 
5) Cynthia Michael has enthusiastically assumed the stepparent role 
with Ashleigh and Schuyler. She exhibits very good parenting 
skills and is well suited to parenthood by desire and 
disposition. At times, however, her well-intentioned gestures 
invade the parental relationship between these children and their 
mother. - I would caution Rodney and Cynthia to keep gifts and 
emotional letters to a minimum while the children are with their 
mother. Though the intent of these communications is to maintain 
contact and express love, they in fact make it more difficult for 
Ashleigh and Schuyler to focus on their relationship with their 
mother. Robin, of course, perceives such communiques to be 
malicious interference. I simply perceive them to be distracting 
and perhaps distressing at times for these children. 
JDS/js 
D. Sanders, Ph.D. 
ical Psychologist 
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Trial Prep 
Michael v. Michael 
Trial Date: July 10,1994 
1. Parenting style/strengths: 
Rod: good structuring, organizational, and rational skills 
Robin: spontaneous, fun, active 
-neither style inherently bad 
-styles dramatically different ~ offers child "illusion" of change when 
shifting residences 
2. Each made one significant error in parenting judgment: 
Rod: excessive use of force with Haley 
Robin:; abandonments primary care of children for extended period 
(career drive explains her decision only to certain point, perhaps 
six months, after that she had evidence family was not timing to 
California and marriage might not Work, she cnose to remain in 
California and removed children abruptly and without 
psychological preparation to California) 
3. Schuyler: 
-1st two interviews positive about everyone 
-intent on remaining neutral 
-tantrums have long history™, related to some degree to CP; not simply 
related to custody issue 
4. Ashleigh: 
-able to provide positives and negatives about all adults (logical, realistic 
perspective) 
-independent 
-not as emotionally traumatized by divorce as brother 
5. Original recommendation based on these conclusions: 
-Rod more consistent in desire for primary care 
-children adjusting and doing well in his care 
-no reason to disrupt previously determined, long standing custodial 
arrangement 
6. What has changed since original recommendation? 
-only Schuyler's preference 
-now he is adamant about living with Robin 
-now he strongly dislikes Cynthia 
-now he feels "abused" 
7. Is this preference reality or fantasy based? 
-Fantasy 
-support for it being fantasy based is: 
-relationships have become exceedingly ideaUzed and demonized 
(nothing negative about mother, nothing positive about 
Cynthia); no longer has realistic perspective on parties 
-preference not based on experience 
-believes he can avoid contact with father altogether 
(wants to avoid contact because he feels guilty, and is 
afraid to hurt father's feelings, concerned about father's 
reaction) 
-has not considered the realities of life with mother 
(i.e., daycare) 
8. What factors influenced his preference change? Probably combination of 
at least the following factors: 
-true attachment/affinity for mother 
-fantasy of "better life" with mother 
_ -continuing discussions with mother about change of custody 
-attraction of moving to Missouri 
-normal seeking of better child position in the family 
(i.e.. only child, youngest child, etc.) 
9. What are the psychological bases for his change of preference? 
-Needs to answer 2 questions: 
1. Will Mom take me and keep me ? 
2. Will Dad let me go in love? 
-Living out "abandonment script" 
10. Though I am unsure about which of the above factors actually provoked 
the current statement of preference, I am absolutely convinced that 
Schuyler is devoted to and fixated on the idea of living with his mother. 
Given that "psychological reality" for him, what are the risks involved? 
-Risk of not letting him live out fantasy = 
1. Increase in acting out behavior in Wisconsin to make 
Rod not want him 
2. Increased sense of helplessness, hopelessness, 
powerlessness, and possibly depression 
3. Increased idealization of relationships, possibly leading 
to extreme behavior (i.e. runaway) 
-Risk of letting him live out fantasy = 
1. Extreme disappointment and anger when fantasy of 
exceeding tetter life does not materalize 
2. Considerable guilt about leaving father, siblings 
11. If the court, after hearing the evidence presented, decides to honor 
Schuyler's preference, I recommend the following: 
1. Extend Schuyler's summer visitation. Re-evaluate his adjustment 
and preference on or before August 20th. 
2. If at that time his preference to live with mother remains, extend 
visitation through December, 1994, and re-evaluate at that time. 
3. If Schuyler stays with mother through December, she must have 
him in bi-monthly therapy to help monitor his adjustment. 
4. Ashleigh returns to Wisconsin as scheduled. If custody of Schuyler is 
changed at some future date, then the pros and cons of splitting 
this sibling unit will need to be addressed. 
5. I am strongly opposed to a permanent change of custody for either 
child at this point in time. 
This recommendation allows: 
-Schuyler to experiment with living with mother without 
permanent legal consequences 
-Allows these siblings to experience living apart 
-May pave the way for a more fluid custodial relationship between 
the parents 
A-5 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
ROBIN L. CLINK, fka 
ROBIN L. MICHAEL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RODNEY C. MICHAEL, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 915900$f t^j DISTRICT CSiSBT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 1 2 1994 
*m ALT LAKE COUNTY Deputy Cferk 
This matter was before the Court for trial on the plaintiff's 
Amended Petition to Modify Custody, said hearing taking place on 
the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th and 18th of July, 1994. The plaintiff's 
Petition to Modify primarily centers around a request that the 
custody of the two minor children be changed from the defendant to 
the plaintiff, and related issues* On the aforementioned dates, 
the Court took evidence on the initial evidentiary phase of the 
change of custody issue, to wit: whether or not there has been a 
material and significant change of circumstances. The Court 
limited evidence to that initial inquiry as is required in a change 
of custody proceeding. At the conclusion of * the evidence offered 
in connection with the plaintiff's assertion that there had been a 
change of circumstances, the Court took defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss the Petition under advisement so as to evaluate the weight 
of the evidence relating to the issue on change of circumstances 
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since the entry of the original Decree of Divorce in Colorado on 
July 1, 1991. In that Colorado Decree, the defendant was awarded 
physical custody of the two minor children in question, with 
certain visitation rights in the plaintiff, and providing that the 
parties had joint legal custody so that each party would have 
access to important information relating to the children's 
education, medical records and providers, as well as other 
information of interest to parents. 
As further hearing dates were scheduled at the time this 
matter was taken under advisement on July 18, 1994, and in that 
travel arrangements needed to be made in advance of the evidentiary 
hearing on the second phase of the change of custody Petition, the 
Court orally advised counsel on July 21st, that the Court was 
satisfied that the evidence received duffing the course of the 
initial phase of the proceedings did not rise to the level 
necessary and requisite to show a change of circumstances so as to 
allow this matter to proceed to a consideration by this Court of 
the children's best interests. Counsel were further advised by the 
Court on July 21, that the hearings relating to the second phase 
scheduled (consideration of the best interests of the children) 
were cancelled, and that a written opinion setting forth the 
Court's analysis of the evidence relating to change of custody 
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would follow. This Memorandum Decision sets forth in summary form 
the Court's analysis of the evidence that leads the Court to the 
conclusion that there was no requisite change of circumstances, and 
that therefore the plaintiff's Petition for Change of Custody must 
be dismissed. 
As indicated above, the parties were divorced by a Colorado 
court on July 1, 1991. Custody of the children was determined 
following a two day contested hearing. Defendant was awarded 
physical custody of the children, with visitation in the plaintiff. 
As this proceeding follows a custody determination made after a 
contested divorce trial, this Court must look critically at the 
alleged change of circumstances, as opposed to a more relaxed 
standard that might be applicable to a situation where custody is 
awarded based upon default or stipulation. A contested and trial 
determination relating to custody is entitled to, under Utah law, 
greater deference than a custody determination made upon default or 
stipulation. 
Interestingly, at the time of the Colorado trial, both the 
plaintiff and the defendant were residing outside that state. 
Defendant resided in the state of Utah with the children, and the 
plaintiff resided in California. Each were outside the state of 
Colorado because of employment requirements. Following the 
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Colorado divorce Decree, the plaintiff moved from the state of 
California to the state of Utah, where both parties resided until 
the defendant's employment was transferred to the state of 
Wisconsin at the end of 1992. Plaintiff has advised the Court in 
her testimony that she will relocate to the state of Missouri, 
regardless of the Court's decision on this Petition, and is in the 
process of selling her Utah residence in anticipation of that move. 
This matter was originally filed as a Petition to Modify a 
foreign Decree of Divorce on August 20, 1991, less than two months 
after the Colorado Decree. A change in the visitation schedule was 
originally sought, because the plaintiff had relocated from 
California to Utah, and that matter was resolved by stipulation 
approximately one year later. In November of 1992, the plaintiff 
filed a second Verified Petition to Modify £he Colorado Decree of 
Divorce in this action, seeking a change of custody, alleging the 
change of circumstance to be the remarriage of the defendant. 
On December 31, 1992, the plaintiff filed a further Amended 
Verified Petition seeking to modify physical custody that had been 
lodged with the defendant on multiple bases, including the 
remarriage of the defendant, the relocation of the defendant from 
Utah to Wisconsin, and generally speaking, a deteriorating 
relationship between the children and the defendant and their 
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stepmother. The parties have then for all intents and purposes 
been involved in ongoing litigation regarding the Colorado custody 
order since it was entered. 
Since the divorce, both the plaintiff and the defendant have 
remarried. In summary fashion, the plaintiff claims that there has 
been a significant change of circumstances in that: 
1. The defendant has remarried, and that the children and 
particularly the older child, Schuyler, does not get along with his 
stepmother, Cynthia Michael. 
2. That defendant's move to Wisconsin as a result of his job 
transfer constitutes a change of circumstances. 
3. That defendant's direct involvement with the children has 
been reduced, because he now has help with rearing the children 
from his current spouse, Cynthia Michael, and that that constitutes 
a change of circumstances. 
4. That the children, again, at least the older child, 
Schuyler, has expressed a strong desire to reside with the 
plaintiff and manifested an unwillingness to reside with the 
defendant. 
5. Finally, plaintiff has asserted that the plaintiff's 
refusal to facilitate visitation since the defendant's move to the 
state of Wisconsin constitutes a change of circumstances. 
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There is nothing new since the Colorado Decree on the basis 
that the parties live in different states. Except for a short 
period of time in Utah; both the plaintiff1 and the defendant have 
moved and lived elsewhere. Immediately prior to the commencement 
of the Colorado divorce action, the defendant resided in Colorado 
and the plaintiff in California. At the time of the,divorce trial 
in Colorado, the plaintiff resided in California, and the defendant 
resided in the state of Utah. The plaintiff later moved to the 
state of Utah and following that, in the early part of 1993, the 
defendant relocated to the state of Wisconsin. 
All of the moves by both parties since the divorce, with the 
exception of plaintiff's move to the state of Utah were work-
related. At the time of the divorce, the Judge was certainly aware 
that the parties lived in states other than the state of Colorado, 
and accordingly would have been aware that at that time both 
parties had relocated outside the state of Colorado for work-
related reasons. There is nothing new in defendant's work-related 
location change from Utah to Wisconsin. The plaintiff's claim that-
the defendant's move was to distance the children from her is not 
supported by any believable evidence. The Court finds that the 
defendant's move was certainly something that could and should have 
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been reasonably foreseen at the time of the divorce, and also 
anticipated as a possibility later on, inasmuch as this Court 
during the pendency of the proceedings and before the move, 
required an advance notice of relocation provision• The plaintiff 
and the defendant both made appropriate job-related relocations, 
and even though the defendant was not able to provide the requisite 
advance notice of his move to Wisconsin, an appropriate pre-move 
hearing was had and the intent of the notice was therefore met. 
The Court finds that the defendant's relocation was not only 
something foreseeable to the parties at the time of the divorce, 
but likely anticipated at that time. 
Neither party has any connection with the state of Utah, other 
than jobs and the children. Plaintiff's extended family support is 
outside the state of Utah in Missouri, where she is moving as soon 
as she is able to accomplish the sale of her residence. The 
evidence in this case shows no improper motive on the part of the 
defendant in relocating to the state of Wisconsin as a result of 
his employment. 
Plaintiff's move-related claim that the relocation has 
negatively impacted the children, and that such impact constituted 
a change of circumstances is likewise not supported by the 
believable evidence. The Court recognizes that any change, 
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including relocation, has some effect, usually perceived by the 
children to be negative, on children. The evidence does show, 
however, that the children are doing well in school in the state of 
Wisconsin, and have adequately adjusted and become part of the 
community at their new residence. The Court also notes that the 
evidence supports a finding and the Court does find that the 
defendant took extraordinary steps as referred to in this record to 
minimize the natural adverse effect of the move on the children by 
seeking advice from professionals in the area who could instruct 
the defendant on what steps to take with the children on that 
issue. 
Defendant's remarriage, rather than being a negative factor in 
the children's lives, is a positive factor. Cynthia Michael is 
able to assist her husband, the defendant;, to some degree in 
meeting the children's daily needs. Cynthia Michael has not 
attempted to act inappropriately towards the children, and evidence 
suggesting to the contrary is not persuasive. Defendant's present 
wife has not attempted to replace the plaintiff as the children's 
mother any more than the plaintiff's present husband has attempted 
to take the place of the defendant as the children's father. The 
Court notes that Schuyler's testimony in chambers did not rise to 
the level claimed as to the defendant's present wife, Cynthia 
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Michael's, and on that issue, even to the extent negative, was 
animated and used language uncharacteristic of a child of the age 
and maturity of Schuyler. The Court believes that Schuyler's 
statements regarding his stepmother may have been implanted, 
hopefully inadvertently, by persons with the plaintiff's interests 
in mind. The children, whether with the plaintiff or the 
defendant, are in a better position, having contact with a 
stepparent, especially an appropriate stepparent, than the children 
would be in a daycare or spending time when not with the plaintiff 
or the defendant, with a person who would constitute a "legal" 
stranger. To the extent that the defendant's remarriage has been 
a change in circumstances, it constitutes a positive change in the 
defendant's household and not a basis to find a change of 
circumstances for the purposes of considering a change of custody. 
The allegations that the children are being "abused" 
(Schuyler's term), by their stepmother are not supported by the 
believable evidence. There is no sufficient change in 
circumstances that would allow this Petition to proceed, based upon 
the defendant's remarriage or the children's relationship with 
their stepmother, Cynthia Michael. 
The Court turns to the defendant's assertion of change of 
circumstances due to visitation problems. A review of this record 
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shows that it is replete with visitation disputes since the divorce 
was entered in July of 1991. Accordingly, continued disputes are 
not new, and do not constitute a change of circumstances as 
unfortunate as they may be. 
The evidence in this case shows that since the defendants 
move to the state of Wisconsin, the visitation, considering its 
frequency and the fact that the defendant bears the total financial 
obligation therefore has gone reasonably smooth. The evidence 
shows that weather, and on one occasion finances, have impacted 
visitation. The majority of the visitation problems revolve around 
agreeing upon times for make-up visitation when the weather has 
prohibited the children visiting their mother because problems with 
airline schedules. Neither party has been particularly cooperative 
regarding alternative visitation days. Inasmuch as the visitation 
difficulties have not changed since the inception of the divorce 
Decree, there is not a change of circumstances, and to the extent 
that difficulties in rescheduling missed visitation under the 
circumstances of the temporary Order, considering its frequency and 
the distance between the children and their mother, there is no 
evidence to support that difficulties in visitation constitute a 
change of circumstances sufficient to allow this Court to revisit 
the issue of custody. The difficulties are merely ongoing, and to 
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a large degree a result of a monthly visitation schedule requiring 
two small children to be shuttled by air halfway across the 
country, principally at defendant's expense. 
Turning to the last major area that the plaintiff alleges 
constitutes a change of circumstances, Schuyler's recently stated 
preference to live with the plaintiff, and his stated reluctance to 
be with his father, the defendant, the Court notes with some 
interest as did Dr. Sanders (the Court's designated expert), that 
both children had continually maintained a neutral position 
regarding their preference as to living location until Dr. Sanders' 
last interview, which was the day before this hearing was scheduled 
to commence, when Schuyler asserted that he wanted to live with his 
mother and effectively didn't want anything to do with his father. 
It was further reported by Dr. Sanders that Schuyler advised 
her that his stepmother "abused" him. Dr. Sanders was unable to 
account for this sudden and drastic change from the "safe" and 
neutral position adopted by Schuyler, except that she was of the 
opinion that Schuyler's perception of life with his mother, the 
plaintiff, and how that would be if he resided with her was based 
upon fantasy and not reality. She did not believe that the child 
had been influenced by the plaintiff. While Schuyler's announced 
change from a position of refusing to state a preference to a 
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strong preference towards residing with the plaintiff is certainly 
a change, unless the change is based upon reality, it has no basis 
and cannot be considered a change for purposes of determining 
whether or not there has been a significant change of 
circumstances. The following observations are relevant to the 
present stated position of Schuyler. 
Schuyler has been with his mother for the six week period of 
time prior to the hearing. Part of that time Schuyler has been 
with his maternal grandparents at their farm in Missouri. The 
visitation periods at his grandparents in Missouri and with his 
mother are clearly filled with fun activities and carefree times. 
There are no schedules, no schoolwork, no lessons, or athletic 
practice, household chores or the like. £11 the activities are 
geared towards having an enjoyable time, especially, things that 
are enjoyable for a child the age of Schuyler. He has the 
opportunity to be involved with farm animals, he is allowed to 
operate four-wheel off-road vehicles, participates in trips to 
amusement parks such as Lagoon and Raging Waters. Those activities 
are surely enjoyable for Schuyler, and he is lucky to have access 
to those activities with his mother, but they are not what would 
occur on a long-term basis when school, children's household 
responsibilities, and the like must be considered. To the extent 
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that Schuyler's stated preference is based upon his activities with 
his mother, the plaintiff, and her extended family, those 
activities are not the reality of what would occur on a day-in and 
day-out basis if he was with his mother, the plaintiff, full-time. 
The Court determines such to be the case, even in the face of 
plaintiff's attempts to portray her lifestyle as being "laid back" 
and involving a lot of fun activities. The Court does not believe 
that the plaintiff's normal lifestyle is such that it includes 
nonstop fun activities for children. 
While the Court has no evidence that Schuyler has been 
influenced by the plaintiff, some of his words and demeanor suggest 
that his statements may not be his own. As indicated earlier, his 
statements in chambers were not as strong as those made to Dr. 
Sanders and related by her during her testimony during the course 
of this trial. Finally, the Court is concerned that the 
plaintiff's extended family may be influencing Schuyler. The Court 
notes that the plaintiff's mother, Arlene Wilcox, who testified as 
a witness in this case, indicated among other things, that she had 
a poor relationship with one of her other children, one of the 
plaintiff's siblings, because she (Arlene Wilcox) had intervened in 
a custody dispute between her son and his spouse. The children 
have spent considerable time with their maternal grandmother, and 
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she, in view of her position, could certainly exercise considerable 
influence over them if she chose to do so. As she indicated in the 
circumstance with her own son, the children's grandmother, Ms. 
Wilcox, has chosen to be involved in some of her other 
grandchildren's custody issues. 
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court does not believe that 
Schuyler's stated desire to reside with his mother constitutes a 
significant or material, or valid change of circumstance. Further, 
even if the stated change of preference by Schuyler constituted a 
material change of circumstances, that change in and of itself is 
insufficient to allow this Court to find a material change of 
circumstances, and then proceed on to the question of best 
interests. The appellate courts of this state have clearly 
announced that a child's stated change in preference, even when 
based in reality, is not sufficient in and of itself to make a 
change of circumstances to meet the requirements of the first phase 
in a petition to modify custody. 
The Court is therefore unable to find a legitimate change in 
circumstances since the entry of the Decree of Divorce between the 
parties, and is therefore compelled to dismiss the defendant's 
Petition to change custody of the parties' minor children. 
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The defendant has requested attorney fees as a result of 
plaintiff's Petition to Modify. The Court will consider the 
attorney fees request and therefore directs that defendant's 
counsel submit an appropriate Affidavit setting forth the fees 
requested and a supporting Memorandum outlining the factual and 
legal basis that should impact an award of fees and/or costs. The 
expenses related to Dr. Sanders should also be addressed. The 
Affidavit and Memorandum should be filed within fifteen (15) days. 
The plaintiff may respond in accordance with Rule 4-501 of the Code 
of Judicial Administration. Defendant's counsel should prepare 
appropriate Findings and an Order of Dismissal reserving costs and 
fees. 
Dated this /^Aia^~4^f--Aucfustf 1994. 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOOOooo— 
ROBIN L. CLINK, fka 
ROBIN L. MICHAEL 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RODNEY C. MICHAEL, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF MODIFICATION 
OF DECREE AND DISMISSAL OF 
PLAINTIFF'S PETITION 
Civil No. 915900171 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
—oooOOOooo— 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial on Plaintiffs 
Amended Petition to Modify Custody on the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th and 18th of July, 
1994, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding. The Plaintiff was present in person, 
represented by counsel Suzanne Marelius. The Defendant was present in person 
represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz. The court heard and considered the 
testimony of each of the parties and the witnesses offered by each, the,testimony of the 
custody evaluator appointed by the court, Dr. Jill Sanders, and received into evidence 
various exhibits offered by the parties. At the conclusion of trial on the 18th day of July, 
1994, the Defendant moved the court to dismiss the Petition of the Plaintiff as to a 
change in custody based on there not being a material and substantial change of 
circumstances. The court following the direction of the Utah Supreme Court in change 
of custody matters, had limited evidence in the initial inquiry to a material and significant 
change of circumstance. At the conclusion of hearing the evidence and the argument, 
on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Petition, the court took the Defendant's 
Motion under advisement so as to evaluate the weight of the evidence relating to the 
issue of change of circumstances since the entry of the original Decree of Divorce in 
Colorado on July 1, 1991, which Decree was entered after a two day trial on the issue 
of custody. The court also heard prior to and during the course of trial various 
stipulations from counsel for their clients as to other issues presented in the Petition of 
the Plaintiff and the request of the attorneys for an award of attorney's fees and costs 
in this matter. The court set further hearings for the 1st and 2nd of August, 1994, 
because travel arrangements had to be made in advance of that hearing on the second 
phase of the custody petition. The court orally advised counsel on July 21, 1994 that 
the court was satisfied that the evidence received during the course of the initial phase 
of the proceedings did not rise to the level necessary to show a material and substantial 
change of circumstances so as to allow the matter to proceed to consideration of the 
best interest of the children and those proceedings were vacated. Thereafter, the court 
on the 12th day of August, 1994, issued its written Memorandum Decision in this matter 
and having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
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1. This court has jurisdiction over the parties, their minor children and 
subject matter of this action. 
2. The Petition of the Plaintiff to change physical custody from the 
Defendant to herself is denied and dismissed with prejudice. 
3. This court concludes it should accept the Stipulation of the parties as 
to visitation and therefore modifies its prior orders in regard to visitation to award 
visitation as follows: 
a. Ashleigh and Schuyler shall spend nine continuous weeks with 
their mother during the summer vacation from school. 
b. Ashleigh and Schuyler shall spend a week at Thanksgiving 
with the Plaintiff. This week shall commence on the Monday before 
Thanksgiving and end the Sunday after Thanksgiving. 
c. Ashleigh and Schuyler shall spend a one week period during 
early spring with their mother which shall coincide with the spring vacation 
from school. 
d* Ashleigh and Schuyler shall spend half their Christmas 
vacation with each parent with Christmas Day in 1994 with their father and 
Christmas Day in 1995 with their mother. They shall continue, thereafter, 
spending one-half the Christmas vacation from school with each parent and 
alternate Christmas Day each year. 
4. If the Plaintiff is going to be in Wisconsin or where the children 
reside, she shall have the right to visit with the children on two weeks advance notice, 
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provided, however, that the visitation shall not interfere with their school or regularly 
scheduled activities. 
5. The Plaintiff shall have direct access to all personnel involved with 
her children's academic, medical and extracurricular activities as previously ordered by 
this court, but, she shall be responsible for regularly contacting those persons in order 
to maintain an understanding of her children's activities and shall be allowed to attend 
any or all of the children's school conferences, school activities, and extracurricular 
activities. Defendant shall advise school, medical and occupational therapist personnel 
to send copies of any reports sent to him to Plaintiff. 
6. The Plaintiff shall be notified immediately in the case of any medical 
emergency and the Defendant shall be notified of any medical emergency during 
visitation. 
7. Plaintiff shall have free telephone access to the children. During the 
times that the children are visiting with the Plaintiff, the Defendant shall have free 
telephone access to the children. 
8. Plaintiff shall continue Schuyler's physical exercises and 
physical/occupational therapy during visitation. 
9. Pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties, the court reserves and 
takes under advisement the issue of Defendant's request that Plaintiff pay part of the 
visitation transportation costs for the minor children. Plaintiff is ordered to provide the 
court and counsel for the Defendant information regarding her earnings when she 
secures employment in Missouri and when her husband recovers from his surgery and 
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is employed and to supply information concerning his earnings once he is employed. 
The court will rule on this question when it has sufficient information to reach an 
appropriate determination. 
10. Each of the parties shall exchange information about the children 
and be flexible regarding visitation facilitate travel in the best interests of the children and 
to permit the children to participate in special events in both the family of the Plaintiff and 
the family of the Defendant. 
11. Defendant's counsel shall submit an appropriate Affidavit setting forth 
the fees requested and a supporting Memorandum outlining the factual and legal basis 
that should impact an award of fees and/or costs. The expenses related to Dr. Sanders 
shall also be addressed. The Affidavit and Memorandum should be filed within fifteen 
(15) days. The Plaintiff may respond in accordance with Rule 4-501 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration. 
DATED this ' / dav of AJlU&^u^\ 1994. /{f y f /(JLU&J^U^A 
5 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
AND CONTENT THIS 
DAY OF , 1994: 
SUZANNE MARELIUS, Counsel 
for Plaintiff 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, Counsel \ 
for Defendant ° ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
hereby certify that I caused to be delivered this J J """^ day of 
entitled matter to: 
Suzanne Marelius, Esq. 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
(dsd\mb\Michael. Order) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOOOooo— 
ROBIN L CLINK, fka 
ROBIN L MICHAEL 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RODNEY C. MICHAEL, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 915900171 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
—oooOOOooo— 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial on Plaintiffs 
Amended Petition to Modify Custody on the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th and 18th of July, 
1994, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding. The Plaintiff was present in person, 
represented by counsel Suzanne Marelius. The Defendant was present in person 
represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz. The court heard and considered the 
testimony of each of the parties and the witnesses offered by each, the testimony of the 
custody evaluator appointed by the court, Dr. Jill Sanders, and received into evidence 
various exhibits offered by the parties. At the conclusion of trial on the 18th day of July, 
1994, the Defendant moved the court to dismiss the Petition of the Plaintiff as to a 
change in custody based on there not being a material and substantial change of 
circumstances. The court following the direction of the Utah Supreme Court in change 
of custody matters, had limited evidence in the initial inquiry to a material and significant 
change of circumstance. At the conclusion of hearing the evidence and the argument 
on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Petition, the court took the Defendant's 
Motion under advisement so as to evaluate the weight of the evidence relating to the 
issue of change of circumstances since the entry of the original Decree of Divorce in 
Colorado on July 1, 1991, which Decree was entered after a two day trial on the issue 
of custody. The court also heard prior to and during the course of trial various 
stipulations from counsel for their clients as to other issues presented in the Petition of 
the Plaintiff and the request of the attorney for an award of attorney's fees and costs in 
this matter. The court set further hearings for the 1st and 2nd of August, 1994, because 
travel arrangements had to be made in advance of that hearing on the second phase of 
the custody petition. The court orally advised counsel on July 21, 1994 that the court 
was satisfied that the evidence received during the course of the initial phase of the 
proceedings did not rise to the level necessary to show a material and substantial 
change of circumstances so as to allow the matter to proceed to consideration of the 
best interest of the children and those proceedings were vacated. Thereafter, the court 
on the 12th day of August, 1994, issued its written Memorandum Decision in this matter. 
Being thus advised in the premises the court now makes and enters the following as its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
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1. The Plaintiff filed a Verified Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce 
requesting a change in physical custody of the children from the Plaintiff to the 
Defendant on or about October 8, 1992. 
2. At the time of the filing of the Petition to Modify the Decree of 
Divorce, the Plaintiff and Defendant were both residents of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
3. The parties were originally divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered 
July 1, 1991 in Jefferson County, Colorado after a two-day trial, April 24th and April 25th, 
1991, over the issue of custody of their minor children. After the trial, April 24 and April 
25, 1991, the District Court for Jefferson County, State of Colorado, awarded joint legal 
custody to the parties and placed physical custody of the children in the Defendant, 
Rodney C. Michael. Prior to the entry of that Order, custody evaluations were performed 
by Judith Jones Nugaris, MSW, filed in October of 1990 and by Dr. Mary Hansen, Ph.D. 
filed on April 4, 1991. At the time of the trial in Colorado, both the Plaintiff and 
Defendant were residing outside of Colorado. The Defendant resided in the State of 
Utah with the children and the Plaintiff resided in California. Each resided outside the 
State of Colorado because of employment requirements. 
4. Plaintiff filed a Verified Petition on about the 10th day of August, 
1991 seeking to domesticate that Decree as a Utah Decree and modify its provisions in 
regard to visitation because Plaintiff had relocated from California to Utah. The matter 
was resolved by stipulation approximately one year later. 
5. On September 29, 1992 an Order was entered effecting the 
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agreement of the parties made on October 7, 1991 when the Defendant appeared before 
the court, Commissioner Sandra Peuler presiding, and agreed to the visitation and child 
support relief requested by the Plaintiff as well as domestication of the Colorado Decree 
of Divorce as a Utah judgment. 
6. Following the entry of the Colorado Divorce Decree, the Plaintiff 
moved from the State of California to the State of Utah. In August of 1991, when the 
Plaintiff filed her Petition to Amend the Decree in regard to visitation both parties both 
resided in Utah. 
7. The Colorado Decree awarded physical custody of the two minor 
children, Schuyler born December 17, 1985, and Ashleigh, born July 10, 1987 to the 
Defendant their father, Rodney Michael, and awarded substantial visitation rights to the 
Plaintiff. It awarded joint legal custody to Plaintiff and Defendant so that each party 
would have access to important information relating to the children's education, medical 
records and medical providers as well as other information of interest to the parties as 
parents. As Schuyler suffers from cerebral palsy, it was and is important that both 
parents be involved in providing the appropriate physical therapy for him when residing 
with or visiting each parent. 
8. As the parties were divorced by a Colorado court on July 1, 1991, 
after a two-day trial on the issue of custody and this proceeding followed, this court must 
view this case as one where a custody determination made after a contested custody 
trial is under challenge. This court is required by governing Utah law to look critically at 
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the alleged change of circumstances as opposed to a more relaxed standard that might 
be applicable where a custody was awarded based on default or stipulation. A contested 
custody determination relating to custody, is entitled to greater deference than a custody 
determination made upon default or stipulation. 
9. Plaintiff filed her second Petition in the Utah proceedings on October 
8, 1992, approximately one month after the Order establishing visitation and child 
support was entered in September of 1992. It alleged a modification in the Decree was 
necessary because of the change of circumstances effected by the Defendant's 
remarriage, which occurred on November 30, 1991 when the Defendant married Cynthia 
Michael. The Petition was amended on December 31, 1992 to add additional grounds 
for a change of circumstances and requesting that the Defendant not be permitted to 
move from the State of Utah which he was doing because he had received a promotion 
from his employer, Allan Bradley, which required relocation to Appleton, Wisconsin. 
10. The Motion requesting that the Defendant not be permitted to move 
was denied. A visitation schedule was established and an Order appointing Dr. Jill 
Sanders to do the custody evaluation was entered on the 7th day of April, 1993. 
11. The Defendant moved to Wisconsin as a result of his transfer and 
promotion by his employer in January, 1993. The Plaintiff advised the court in her 
testimony during July of 1994 that she is in the process of moving to her family home 
in the State of Missouri regardless of the court's decision in this Petition and is in the 
process of selling her Utah residence in anticipation of the move. 
12. The Plaintiff moved from Colorado to California prior to the original 
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divorce of the parties as a result of her employment, a promotion. The Plaintiff remained 
with the same employer when she moved to Utah in 1991, but this was not as a result 
of a promotion. The Defendant moved from Colorado to Utah while the divorce was 
pending in Colorado after Plaintiff had moved to California as a result of a promotion by 
his employer. The Plaintiff testified that her move to Missouri would be for personal 
reasons as she intended to terminate her employment and look for employment in 
Missouri after she arrived. The extended family of the Plaintiff resides primarily in the 
State of Missouri. 
13. The parties have, for all intents and purposes been involved in on-
going litigation regarding the Colorado Custody Order since it was entered. 
14. Since the entry of the Decree, both the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
have remarried. The Plaintiff married Duane Clink on June 27, 1992. The Defendant 
married Cynthia Michael on November 30, 1991. 
15. The five grounds on which the Plaintiff in her Amended Petition filed 
December 31, 1992 asserted there had been a change of circumstances which required 
that physical custody of the children be moved from the Defendant to herself, are as 
follows: 
a. The Defendant remarried and the children, in particular the 
older child, Schuyler, does not get along with his stepmother, Cynthia 
Michael. 
b. Defendant's move to Wisconsin. 
c. Defendant's direct involvement with the children was reduced 
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because now he has help with rearing the children from his current"spouse, 
Cynthia Michael. 
d. The children, at least the older child, Schuyler, expressed a 
strong desire to reside with the Plaintiff and manifested an unwillingness 
to reside with the Defendant. 
e. The Defendant's alleged refusal to facilitate visitation since 
his move to the State of Wisconsin and Plaintiff believed that the primary 
caretaking duties had been shifted to her and Defendant travelled regularly 
leaving the children with alternate caretakers. 
16. There is no change of circumstances regarding the residences and 
moves of the parties since entry of the Colorado Decree on the alleged grounds that the 
parties live in different states. Except for an eighteen month period of time in Utah, both 
the Plaintiff and the Defendant have moved and lived in different states. Immediately 
prior to the commencement of the Colorado divorce action, the Defendant resided in 
Colorado and the Plaintiff in California. At the time of the divorce trial in Colorado, the 
Plaintiff resided in California, and the Defendant resided in the State of Utah. The 
Plaintiff later moved to the State of Utah and following that, in the early part of 1993, the 
Defendant relocated to the State of Wisconsin. The Plaintiff related at trial she intends 
to and is in the process of moving to Missouri. Dr. Sanders did not believe the moves 
of the parties were a change in circumstances. She noted the parties had moved during 
their marriage, during the pendency of this matter and expected to move in the future. 
17. All of the moves by both parties since the divorce, with the exception 
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of Plaintiffs move to the State of Utah were work-related. At the time of the divorce, the 
Judge in Colorado was aware that the parties lived in states other than the State of 
Colorado, and accordingly would have been aware that at that time both parties had 
relocated outside the State of Colorado for work-related reasons. There is nothing new 
in Defendant's work-related location change from Utah to Wisconsin. Robert Becker, 
formerly the Defendant's supervisor in Allen Bradley, testified that for one moving up the 
corporate ladder (the Defendant is very talented and moving up the corporate ladder) 
would expect to move every few years and such moves are a regular foreseeable 
occurrence. Each of the moves, from Colorado to Utah and from Utah to Wisconsin has 
been the result of a substantial promotion. The move of the Plaintiff from Colorado to 
California was also a promotion from her employer and she made that move believing 
that the Defendant would move to California with her. The Plaintiffs claim that the 
Defendant's move to Wisconsin was to distance the children from her is not supported 
by any believable evidence. The court finds that the Defendant's move was certainly 
something that could and should have been reasonably foreseen at the time of the 
divorce, and also anticipated as a possibility later on, inasmuch as this court during the 
pendency of the proceedings and before the move, required an advance notice of 
relocation provision. 
18. The Plaintiff and the Defendant both made appropriate job-related 
relocations, and even though the Defendant was not able to provide the requisite 
advance notice of his move to Wisconsin, an appropriate pre-move hearing was had and 
the intent of the notice was therefore met. The court finds that the Defendant's 
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relocation was not only something foreseeable to the parties at the time of the divorce, 
but likely anticipated at that time. 
19. Neither party has any connection with the State of Utah, other than 
jobs and the children. Plaintiffs extended family support is outside the State of Utah in 
Missouri, where she is moving as soon as she is able to accomplish the sale of her 
residence. The evidence in this case shows no improper motive on the part of the 
Defendant in relocating to the State of Wisconsin as a result of his employment. 
20. Plaintiffs move-related claim that the relocation has negatively 
impacted the children, and that such impact constituted a change of circumstances is not 
supported by believable evidence. The court recognizes that any change, including 
relocation, has some effect, usually perceived by the children to be negative, on children. 
The evidence does show, however, that the children are doing well in school in the State 
of Wisconsin, have adequately adjusted and become part of the community at their new 
residence, have formed friendships and are happy and well adjusted. The court also 
notes that the evidence supports a finding and the court does find that the Defendant 
took extraordinary steps (consulting with psychologists about how to ease the stress of 
the move, and then taking the children to Appleton, Wisconsin, before the move to allow 
them to see their new school, to meet their classmates and to see the community to 
which they would move and help make choices about the house and living arrangements 
in Appleton) to minimize the natural adverse effect of the move on the children by 
seeking advice from professionals who could instruct the Defendant on what steps to 
take with the children on that issue and then to follow that advice. 
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21. Defendant's remarriage, rather than being a negative factor in the 
children's lives, is a positive factor. Cynthia Michael is able to assist her husband, the 
Defendant in meeting the children's daily needs. Cynthia Michael has not attempted to 
act inappropriately towards the children and evidence suggesting to the contrary is not 
persuasive. Defendant's present wife has not attempted to replace the Plaintiff as the 
children's mother any more than the Plaintiffs present husband has attempted to take 
the place of the Defendant as the children's father. The court notes that Schuyler's 
testimony in chambers did not rise to the level claimed as to negative feelings about the 
Defendant's present wife, Cynthia Michael and to the extent it was negative, Schuyler 
was animated and used language uncharacteristic of a child of the age and maturity of 
Schuyler. The court believes that Schuyler's statements regarding his stepmother may 
have been implanted, hopefully inadvertently, by persons with the Plaintiffs interests in 
mind. The children, whether with the Plaintiff or the Defendant, are in a better position, 
having contact with a stepparent, especially an appropriate stepparent, than the children 
would be in a daycare or spending time when not with the Plaintiff or the Defendant, with 
a person who would constitute a "legal" stranger. To the extent that the Defendant's 
remarriage has been a change in circumstances, it constitutes a positive change in the 
Defendant's household and not a basis to find a change of circumstances for the 
purposes of considering a change of custody. 
22. The court finds Defendant was involved with caring for and sharing 
family activities with his children before and after his remarriage both in Utah and in 
Wisconsin. The court finds no change in this behavior by the Defendant or the children 
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after his marriage to Cynthia Michael. 
23. Dr. Sanders recommended to the court that there not be a change 
in the custody Order in her original report to the court. Despite the fact that Schuyler in 
his interview just before trial with Dr. Sanders was very strong in stating that he desired 
to live with his mother, she felt that no change in custody should occur. The original 
findings and recommendations to the court by Dr. Sanders were very similar to that 
presented to the Colorado court by Dr. Mary Hansen, who recommended that physical 
custody of the children be placed with the Defendant, Rod Michael. Dr. Sanders noted 
that her original recommendation had been based on the Defendant's more consistent 
desire for custody, the children were adjusting and doing well in his care, and there was 
no reason to disrupt a previously determined long-standing custodial arrangement. The 
only change that Dr. Sanders found was Schuyler's preference in her last interview with 
the children. This preference was not as adamantly stated by Schuyler when he 
appeared before the court to express his own desires to the court in chambers as Dr. 
Sanders descnbed them in his statements to her. This expressed preference occurred 
after spending 6 weeks with his mother, Robin Clink, the Plaintiff who did not permit 
contact with Rod Michael, until after Schuyler had seen Dr. Sanders. There had been 
no change in Ashleigh. Dr. Sanders related to the court that she believed this 
preference was not based on reality, it was based on fantasy which though based upon 
a true attachment for his mother, was a fantasy about a better life with his mother 
because he spends play times, that is unstructured time away from school with his 
mother while he spends structured school and work time with his father. He has had 
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continuing discussions with his mother about change of custody while the Defendant will 
not discuss changing custody or custody issues with Schuyler. Schuyler sees life with 
his mother as being life in Missouri where he has always gone to play and which he 
views as a sanctuary with his grandparents that removes him from the dispute between 
his parents over his custody and he would move from being the oldest child in a three 
child family (Cynthia and Rod Michael have had a child born of their marriage, Jake, who 
was born on March 31, 1993) to the younger of two children if he lived with his mother. 
The court finds that the evidence supports the findings and recommendations of Dr. 
Sanders and they are adopted as the findings of the court on these points. 
24. The allegations that he is being "abused" (Schuyler's term), by his 
stepmother is not supported by the believable evidence. 
25. There is no sufficient change in circumstances that would allow this 
Petition to proceed, based upon the Defendant's remarriage or the children's relationship 
with their stepmother, Cynthia Michael. In fact, the evidence was and the court finds that 
the children are happy, well adjusted and interact in a loving, happy relationship with 
Defendant and Cynthia Michael and Defendant as he did before his marriage to Cynthia 
Michael is very involved in caring for, interacting with, and raising his children. 
26. At the final pretrial of this matter, counsel for the Defendant pointed 
out to the court and counsel for the Plaintiff that the children would have spent 
approximately 6 weeks with the Plaintiff prior to trial and that it would be a good idea for 
the children to again see Dr. Sanders, the court appointed psychologist, immediately 
prior to trial to see if there had been any change in circumstance. To facilitate this 
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evaluation, counsel for the Defendant requested that the children be returned to the 
Defendant before that meeting took place. The Plaintiff refused to do this. She 
permitted no contact between the Defendant and Schuyler or Ashleigh before they saw 
Dr. Sanders, though counsel for the Defendant attempted to arrange for Schuyler and 
Ashleigh to visit with the Defendant before and be taken to that interview by the 
Defendant. (Exhibits 16-D and 20-D). 
27. The court advised counsel for the Plaintiff at the pretrial that if 
counsel for the Defendant's request was not honored, the court would have to consider 
the fact that Plaintiff would not agree to allow the children to see the Defendant before 
seeing Dr. Sanders. Despite this statement, Plaintiff refused to permit the children to see 
their father before seeing Dr. Sanders. 
28. The court finds no change of circumstances due to visitation problems. 
A review of this record shows that it is replete with visitation disputes since the divorce 
was entered in July of 1991. Accordingly, continued disputes are not new, and do not 
constitute a change of circumstances as unfortunate as they may be. 
29. The evidence in this case shows that since the Defendant's move 
to the state of Wisconsin, the visitation, considering its frequency and the fact that the 
Defendant bears the total financial obligation therefore* has gone reasonably smoothly. 
The evidence shows that weather, and on one occasion finances, have impacted 
visitation. The majority of the visitation problems revolve around agreeing upon times 
for make-up visitation when the weather prohibited the children visiting their mother 
because of problems with airline schedules. Neither party has been particularly 
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cooperative regarding alternative visitation days. Inasmuch as the visitation difficulties 
have not changed since the inception of the divorce Decree, there is not a change of 
circumstances, and to the extent that difficulties in rescheduling missed visitation under 
the circumstances of the temporary Order, considering its frequency and the distance 
between the children and their mother, there is no evidence to support that difficulties 
in visitation constitute a change of circumstances sufficient to allow this court to revisit 
the issue of custody. The difficulties are merely ongoing, and to a large degree a result 
of a monthly visitation schedule requiring two small children to be shuttled by air halfway 
across the country, at Defendant's expense. 
30. The Plaintiff alleges a change of circumstances based on Schuyler's 
recently stated preference to live with the Plaintiff, and his stated reluctance to be with 
his father. The court notes with some interest as did Dr. Sanders (the Court's 
designated expert), that both children had continually maintained a neutral position 
regarding their preference as to living location until Dr. Sanders' last interview, which 
was the day before this hearing was scheduled to commence, when Schuyler asserted 
that he wanted to live with his mother and effectively did not want anything to do with 
his father. It was further reported by Dr. Sanders that Schuyler advised her that his 
stepmother "abused" him. Dr. Sanders was unable to account for this sudden and 
drastic change from the "safe" and neutral position adopted by Schuyler, except that she 
was of the opinion that Schuyler's perception of life with his mother, the Plaintiff, and 
how that would be if he resided with her was based upon fantasy and not reality. Dr. 
Sanders did not believe that the child had been influenced by the Plaintiff. While 
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Schuyler's announced change from a position of refusing to state a preference to a 
strong preference towards residing with the Plaintiff is certainly a change, unless the 
change is based upon reality, it has no basis and cannot be considered a change for 
purposes of determining whether or not there has been a significant change of 
circumstances. 
31. The following observations are relevant to the present stated position 
of Schuyler. Schuyler had been with his mother for the six week period of time prior to 
the hearing. Part of that time Schuyler has been with his maternal grandparents at their 
farm in Missouri. The visitation periods at his grandparents in Missouri and with his 
mother are clearly filled with fun activities and carefree times. There are no schedules, 
no schoolwork, no lessons or athletic practice, no household chores or the like. All the 
activities are geared towards having an enjoyable time, especially, things that are 
enjoyable for a child the age of Schuyler. He has the opportunity to be involved with 
farm animals, he is allowed to operate four-wheel off-road vehicles, participates in trips 
to amusement parks. Those activities are surely enjoyable for Schuyler, and he is lucky 
to have access to those activities with his mother, but they are not what would occur on 
a long-term basis when school, children's household responsibilities, and the like must 
be considered. To the extent that Schuyler's stated preference is based upon his 
activities with his mother, the Plaintiff, and her extended family, those activities are not 
the reality of what would occur on a day-in and day-out basis if he was with his mother, 
the Plaintiff, full-time. The court determines such to be the case, even in the face of 
Plaintiffs attempts to portray her lifestyle as being "laid back" and involving a lot of fun 
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activities. The court does not believe that the Plaintiffs normal lifestyle is such that it 
includes nonstop fun activities for children. While the court has no evidence that 
Schuyler has been influenced by the Plaintiff, some of his words and demeanor suggest 
that his statements may not be his own. As indicated earlier, his statements in 
chambers were not as strong as those made to Dr. Sanders and related by her during 
her testimony during the course of this trial. Finally, the court is concerned that the 
Plaintiffs extended family may be influencing Schuyler. The court notes that the 
Plaintiffs mother, Arlene Wilcox, who testified as a witness in this case, indicated among 
other things, that she had a poor relationship with one of her other children, one of the 
Plaintiffs siblings, because she (Arlene Wilcox) had intervened in a custody dispute 
between her son and his spouse. The children have spent considerable time with their 
maternal grandmother, and she, in view of her position, could certainly exercise 
considerable influence over them if she chose to do so. As she indicated in the 
circumstance with her own son, the children's grandmother, Ms. Wilcox, has chosen to 
be involved in some of her other grandchildren's custody issues. 
For all the foregoing reasons, the court does not believe that Schuyler's 
stated desire to reside with his mother constitutes a significant or materials, or valid 
change of circumstance. Further, even if the stated change of preference by Schuyler 
constituted a material change of circumstances, that change in and of itself is insufficient 
to allow this court to find a material change of circumstances, on which to proceed on 
to the question of best interests. The appellate courts of this state have clearly 
announced that a child's stated change in preference, even when based in reality, is not 
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sufficient in and of itself to make a change of circumstances to meet the requirements 
of the first phase in a petition to modify custody. 
32. The court is unable to find a legitimate change in circumstances 
since the entry of the Decree of Divorce between the parties, and is therefore compelled 
to dismiss the Defendant's Petition to change custody of the parties' minor children. 
33. The court finds that the minor children have resided with Defendant 
throughout their lives. They remained with him when Plaintiff, prior to the filing of the 
divorce action, moved to California to pursue her employment. The Defendant has 
provided a stable home and environment for the children and the children have thrived 
in the environment provided for them by the Defendant. The children have not resided 
with the Plaintiff, except for visitation, since she left the marital home in Colorado to 
accept a job promotion in California. 
34. Dr. Sanders recommended and the parties stipulated that visitation 
should be as follows: 
a. Ashleigh and Schuyler should spend nine continuous weeks 
with their mother during the summer vacation from school. 
b. Ashleigh and Schuyler should spend a week at Thanksgiving 
with the Plaintiff. This week should commence on the Monday before 
Thanksgiving and end the Sunday after Thanksgiving. 
c. Ashleigh and Schuyler should spend a one week period 
during early spring with their mother to coincide with the spring vacation 
from school. 
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d. Ashleigh and Schuyler should spend half their Christmas 
vacation with each parent. In 1994 the children should spend Christmas 
Day with their father and in 1995 spend Christmas Day with their mother. 
They should continue, thereafter, spending one-half the Christmas vacation 
from school with each parent and alternate Christmas day each year. 
35. If the Plaintiff is going to be in Wisconsin or where the children 
reside, she should have the right to visit with the children on two weeks advance notice, 
provided, however, that the visitation should not interfere with their school or regularly 
scheduled activities. 
36. The Plaintiff should have direct access to all personnel involved with 
her children's academic, medical and extracurricular activities as previously ordered by 
this court, but, she should be responsible for regularly contacting those persons in order 
to maintain an understanding of her children's activities and, she should be allowed to 
attend any or all of the children's school conferences, school activities, and 
extracurricular activities. Defendant should advise school, medical and occupational 
therapist personnel to send copies of any reports sent to him to Plaintiff. 
37. The Plaintiff should be notified immediately in the case of any 
medical emergency as should the Defendant should the medical emergency occur during 
visitation. 
38. Defendant should have free telephone access to the children during 
the times that the children are visiting with the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff should have free 
telephone access to the children while they reside with Defendant. 
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39. Plaintiff should be required to continue Schuyler's physical exercises 
and physical/occupational therapy during visitation. 
40. Pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties, the court reserves the 
issue of Defendant's request that Plaintiff pay part of visitation transportation costs for 
the minor children. The Plaintiff should be ordered to provide the court and counsel for 
the Defendant information regarding her earnings when she secures employment in 
Missouri and when her husband recovers from his surgery and is employed she should 
provide information about his earnings. 
41. The court finds that the Defendant is not in contempt of the Orders 
of this court. The difficulties in regard to visitation were either caused by financial 
inability to comply with the Order of the court or problems that occurred through no fault 
of the Defendant in regard to weather and transportation problems. 
42. Each of the parties should exchange information about the children 
and be flexible regarding visitation to facilitate travel and visitation in the best interests 
of the children and to permit the children to participate in special events in both the 
family of the Plaintiff and the family of the Defendant. 
43. Each of the parties had requested that they be awarded their 
attorney's fees. As the court has determined that the Petition of the Plaintiff should be 
denied, her request should not be granted. The court will consider the Defendant's 
attorney's fees request and therefore directs that Defendant's counsel submit an 
appropriate affidavit setting forth the fees requested and a supporting memorandum 
outlining the factual and legal basis that should impact an award of fees and/or costs. 
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The expenses related to Dr. Sanders should also be addressed. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action, the 
parties and their minor children. 
2. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah and the Utah Court of 
Appeals have articulated the standards for evaluating a Petition for Change of Custody. 
The present law is based on the decision first articulated in Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d, 
51 (Utah 1982) where the court articulated that prior to a change of custody, the 
Petitioner must show: 
"...a court would not reopen the custody question until it had 
first made a threshold finding of a substantially changed 
circumstances. This would protect the custodial parent from 
harassment by repeated litigation and protect the child from 
"ping-pong" custody awards." 
"Accordingly, we hold that in the future, a trial court's 
decision to modify a Decree by transferring custody of a 
minor child must involve two separate steps. In the initial 
step, the court will receive evidence only as to the nature and 
materiality of any changes in those circumstances upon 
which the earlier award of custody was based. In this step, 
the parties seeking modification must demonstrate (1) that 
since the time of the previous Decree, there have been 
changes in the circumstances upon which the previous award 
was based; and (2) that those changes are sufficiently 
substantial and material to justify reopening the question of 
custody. The trial court must make a separate finding as to 
whether this burden of proof has been met. If so, the court, 
either as a continuation of the same hearing, or in a separate 
hearing, will proceed to the second step. However, where 
that burden of proof is not met, the trial court will not reach 
the second step, the Petition to Modify will be denied, and 
the custody award will remain unchanged. 
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In the second step, having found that a substantial and 
material change in the circumstances justifies a 
reconsideration of the custodial award, the trial court must 
consider the changes in circumstances along with all other 
evidence relevant to the welfare or best interest of the child, 
including the advantage of stability in custodial arrangements 
that will always weigh against changes in the party awarded 
custody." 
649 P.2d at 53-54. 
This test was further refined in Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608 (Utah 1984) 
and Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624 (Utah 1987) to require that the alleged change 
must occur in the custodial home. Then in 1989 the Utah Court of Appeals ruled: 
"Our reading of Hoqqe and its progeny suggest that on a 
petition for custody modification, trial courts should carefully 
scrutinize the facts behind the original award of custody. If 
the initial award was based on a thorough examination by the 
trial court of the various factors pertaining to the child's 
welfare, a rigid application of the change-in-circumstance[s] 
is in order. In such a case, the court has already considered 
the best interests of the child and made a determination 
consistent with that finding. Any subsequent petition for 
modification of custody must overcome a high threshold in 
order to 'protect the child from 'ping-pong' custody awards' 
and the accompanying instability so damaging to a child's 
proper development." 
Mauqhn v. Mauqhn, 770 P.2d 156, at 160. 
3. This court has concluded that there is no change in circumstances 
beyond that of Schuyler's stated preference which the court has determined is not based 
on reality but is fantasy encouraged by some other party. This court was advised by the 
Utah Court of Appeals in Cumminqs v. Cumminqs, 821 P.2d 472, 473 (Utah App. 1991) 
that it should take great care in making a change of custody based on the sole factor of 
a 12 year old child's expressed desires. In this case, Schuyler is 8 years of age and 
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articulating a request which is based on fantasy, not reality. 
4. The court concludes that there has been no substantial or material 
change change in circumstances which would justify a modification of the custody award 
made by the District Court for Jefferson County, Colorado after a contested trial on the 
issue of custody, April 24, 25, 1991, effected by Decree entered July 1, 1991. 
5. This court concludes it should accept the Stipulation of the parties as 
to visitation and therefore modify its prior orders in regard to visitation to award visitation 
as follows: 
a. Ashleigh and Schuyler should spend nine continuous weeks 
with their mother during the summer vacation from school. 
b. Ashleigh and Schuyler should spend a week at Thanksgiving 
with the Plaintiff. This week should commence on the Monday before 
Thanksgiving and end the Sunday after Thanksgiving. 
c. Ashleigh and Schuyler should spend a one week period 
during early spring with their mother which should coincide with the spring 
vacation from school. 
d. Ashleigh and Schuyler should spend half their Christmas 
vacation with each parent with Christmas Day in 1994 should be spent with 
their father and Christmas Day in 1995 should be spent with their mother. 
They should continue, thereafter, spending one-half the Christmas vacation 
from school with each parent and alternate Christmas Day each year. 
6. If the Plaintiff is going to be in Wisconsin or where the children 
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reside, she should have the right to visit with the children on two weeks advance notice, 
provided, however, that the visitation should not interfere with their school or regularly 
scheduled activities. 
7. The Plaintiff should have direct access to all personnel involved with 
her children's academic, medical and extracurricular activities as previously ordered by 
this court, but, she should be responsible for regularly contacting those persons in order 
to maintain an understanding of her children's activities and, she should be allowed to 
attend any or all of the children's school conferences, school activities, and 
extracurricular activities. Defendant should advise school, medical and occupational 
therapists to send copies of any reports sent to him to Plaintiff. 
8. The Plaintiff should be notified immediately in the case of any 
medical emergency as should the Defendant should the emergency occur during 
visitation. 
9. Defendant should have free telephone access to the children during 
the times that the children are visiting with the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff should have free 
telephone access to the children while they reside with Defendant. 
10. Plaintiff should be required to continue Schuyler's physical exercises 
and physical/occupational therapy during visitation. 
11. Pursuant to Stipulation of the parties, the court reserves the issue 
of Defendant's request that Plaintiff pay part of visitation transportation costs for the 
minor children and the Plaintiff is ordered to provide the court and counsel for the 
Defendant information regarding her earnings when she secures employment in Missouri 
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and when her husband recovers from his surgery and is employed and information about 
his earnings once he is employed. 
12. Each of the parties should exchange information about the children 
and be flexible regarding visitation to facilitate travel in the best interests of the children 
and to permit the children to participate in special events in both the family of the Plaintiff 
and the family of the Defendant. 
13. The court concludes that it will consider the attorney's fees request 
of the Defendant and therefore directs that Defendant's counsel submit an appropriate 
Affidavit setting forth the fees requested and a supporting Memorandum outlining the 
factual and legal basis that should impact an award of fees and/or costs. The expenses 
related to Dr. Sanders should also be addressed. The Affidavit and Memorandum 
should be filed within fifteen (15) days. The Plaintiff may respond in accordance with 
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
DATED this / * / day of /fats*/* 
1MOTHY R. HANSONf 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT 
THIS day of , 1994. 
Suzanne Marelius 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
David S. Dolowitz 
Counsel for Defendant 
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